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Abstract 
 
This working paper investigates to what extent Liberia’s post-war elite system is inclusive. In 
order to allow taking a comparative perspective, it firstly describes historic processes of elite 
formation and elite change, describing patterns of oligarchic elite reproduction as well as 
opportunities for political success of lower strata individuals. Its core piece is an overview on 
career paths and social and professional background of elites of Liberia’s first regular post-
war government. It argues that Liberia’s new elite system is significantly more inclusive than 
previous ones, despite discernible continuities. This, however, does not necessarily translate 
into accountability of government. 
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1. Introduction 
Liberia has experienced tremendous ups and downs since its creation in the 1820s. Often 
close to annihilation for more than a century – threatened by indigenous forces on the 
one hand and colonial designs of France and the UK on the other – the state built by US 
American “free men of color” saw some of the world’s highest rates of economic growth 
in the mid-20th century. The period of “growth without development” (Clower et al. 
1966) first and foremost benefitted the country’s small elite but nevertheless had some 
trickle-down effects in the wake of the expansion of state employment, and is widely 
remembered as the golden days of Liberia. From the 1980s to the early 2000s, the country 
plunged from one crisis into the other, as a military coup was followed by two 
immensely destructive civil wars. Eventually in January 2006, a civilian, democratically 
elected government took over, promising a new era of inclusive and accountable 
governance. 
Opinions on the first regular post-war government vary widely within Liberia as 
well as among foreign observers. Some consider it a re-incarnation of Liberia’s pre-1980 
Americo-Liberian oligarchy, or disguised continuation of rule by warring party elites. 
Others see it as representing a new generation of elites – professional, internationally 
experienced, and democratic in orientation.  
Of course, our assessment of opportunities for the state to stabilize and stimulate 
economic development is very much conditioned by the character of the country’s post-
war elite. For instance, we would expect the old oligarchy to re-establish the previous 
system of privilege characterized by private appropriation of spoils of power in 
patrimonial fashion, minimal provision of public goods, and restriction of access to 
power by a narrow, culturally defined population segment. A government representing 
the previous regime of former Warlord Charles Taylor would likely continue to benefit a 
narrow circle of associates and comrades-in-arms and, as is common for former civil war 
factions acceding to power (cf. Roeder/Rothchild 2005; de Zeeuw 2008), readily rely on 
violence as a power resource. A professional and democratic elite could be expected to 
promote a rationalization of governance, advocate meritocratic principles and thus 
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promises increased accountability, more inclusive access to high social status, and the 
opportunity to voice dissent. 
Further, changes in social characteristics of the elite indicate changes in the 
distribution of political power and, probably, in the beneficiaries of the authoritative 
allocation of values. For instance, when individuals from (formerly) powerless 
population segments are recruited into the elite, it may indicate that these segments gain 
political relevance, and that they may be able to obtain a greater share of authoritatively 
allocated values. If formerly marginalized groups are represented by individuals from 
their midst in government, this may indicate that the elite system as a whole is becoming 
more inclusive. 
In search of clues to the issues above, this paper investigates the Liberian political 
elite, focusing on the first regular post-transition government by analysing in detail the 
President and principal ministers. The analysis pays particular attention to elite 
credentials, i.e. criteria determining accession to or recruitment into political elite 
positions, examining social background in terms of ethnicity and family social status, the 
role of social capital and educational as well as professional record.  
The first chapter prepares the analysis in theoretic terms. It first discusses the key 
term of elite, stressing that the dividing line between elites and non-elites cannot be 
defined once and for all. Ambiguities are due to the phenomenon that elite systems are 
hardly ever fully closed and are thus necessary. Further, I develop models of oligarchical 
elite reproduction that can on the one hand explain elite perpetuation. On the other, they 
can serve as methodological tools allowing to observe to what extent empirical trends 
deviate from the model and where oligarchical elite reproduction has its limits. The 
chapter further proposes how to conceptualize elite patterns in a post-war, Third World 
state drawing on the debate on neo-patrimonialism. 
The second chapter describes elite formation in Liberia in historic perspective, 
analysing to what extent power has been historically monopolized by an entrenched 
oligarchy and what opportunities for social rise of less privileged individuals existed. It 
further shortly outlines the shake-up the elite system experienced as a result of the 
military coup and the civil wars. This is intended to further our understanding of the 
extent of changes that can be observed in Liberia’s post-war situation.  The following 
 3 
 
core chapter than investigates the political elite of post-war Liberia by analysing the first 
regular (post-transition) government. The conclusion summarizes key issues of the 
analysis, arguing that significant changes have occurred in the wake of war and 
democratization despite evident continuities. 
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2. Elites and Populace 
Political elites are a classical object of analysis yet that very object remains elusive. 
Classical studies rest on a simple and evident assumption: there are few who rule and 
many who are ruled. Scholars of elites assume that those who rule are a political group 
(“elite”) or cluster of disunited individuals (“elites”) that can be distinguished from the 
general population, and that its patterns and characteristics are helpful for explaining 
politics. Yet any definition of the political elite demarcating it from the populace is 
contested.1 Vilfredo Pareto classically distinguishes between a governing elite – 
comprising all those directly taking or indirectly influencing political decisions – and a 
non-governing elite made up of leaders in non-political settings. Here, power to make or 
influence decisions affecting a significant number of people defines the elite, and only 
those not holding any influence at all are non-elites. Arguing within these parameters, 
Putnam proposes that the definition of political elite we apply is determined by our 
research interest, and can include anything from a few decision makers to the “several 
thousand who occasionally influence national policy” (Putnam 1976: 14).  
Another classic, C. Wright Mills, differentiates the elite into an “inner core” 
participating in taking the major political decisions and the “outer fringes” “whose 
views and interests have to be considered even if they do not actively participate in a 
given decision” (Parry 2005: 31). As all classical elite theorists, Mills argues that politics 
is invariably made by and for an oligarchy, and his elite consists of those who make 
policy and those in whose interest policy is made. Of course, it may be an intricate task 
to tell in whose interest policies are made, as decisions are regularly argued to be in the 
common interest. In any case, the elite as defined by Mills tends to be quite large. 
Gaetano Mosca’s notion of an elite differentiated into two strata is even broader. The 
upper stratum he identifies is small and comprises the few who make political decisions. 
Yet the lower elite stratum is much larger, to the extent that it is occasionally even 
identified with the middle class – whose boundaries are no easier to clearly demarcate. 
The lower elite stratum not only includes opinion leaders and the state administration 
                                                     
1 For an overview over the classical debate on the notion of elite see Parry (2005: 28-56); Hartmann 
(2008); Scott (1990). 
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but – and this renders the definition extremely broad – is the reservoir from which the 
top stratum recruits its members. Here, the ability to legitimately and with some chance 
of success aspire to high political office defines the elite. 
Taking seriously Putnam’s suggestion to define the elite according to research 
interest, we have to reflect on the investigated issue too, i.e. the Liberian elite, in order to 
frame the analysis. Liberia was ruled for some 150 years by people from a small minority 
group drawing a neat, culturally defined line between them and outsiders, and about 25 
years by military and rebel leaders concentrating power in relatively small groups of 
associates. Against this background, the research interest is to what extent the political 
system is inclusive, to what extent it allows newly aspiring individuals and socially 
relevant groups to be politically represented, or to what extent power is concentrated in 
an entrenched oligarchy. Political system here can be understood in terms of Pareto’s 
“governing elites”, comprising all those directly or indirectly participating in making 
national political decisions. In this paper, adopting the positional method the 
government and more specifically the cabinet is taken as a proxy for the “governing 
elites”. This is justified by the fact that high political office either confers power or 
stabilizes otherwise informal positions of power, and that powers to make binding 
decisions are concentrated in the cabinet. We may further assume that inclusive 
government is a good indicator of an inclusive governing elite system. The cabinet thus 
is a relevant sample that is likely to give clues on the broader defined elite. As well, this 
introduces a threshold making sure that a system is not labelled inclusive because it 
occasionally allows otherwise marginal individuals to participate in little meaningful 
decisions. 
However, this does not solve the problem of defining the elite as such. Any 
definition proposed has its merits and its deficits. Generally, the term elite here is used 
as a generic term for those holding political power or being able to decisively influence 
politics. Yet, in particular when investigating the phenomenon of entrenched oligarchies, 
such a definition is little helpful. The term “elite” is thus occasionally extended to cover 
those in whose interest politics is made and from where governing elites are recruited, as 
will become clear from the context. Thus, a term like “elite family” used here includes 
the generally non-influential but privileged wives and children of governing elites, in 
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whose interest politics is likely to be made and who constitute a potential pool of future 
recruitment. Generally, the ambiguities in delimiting the boundaries of elites refer to 
links between powerful and dominated strata of society as well as opportunities for the 
rise of less privileged individuals and thus cannot be fully resolved. 
Inclusive government as understood here has two dimensions. On the one hand, it 
means that recruitment into high executive office is open to individuals from diverse 
social and regional backgrounds. This implies that we do not pre-suppose a “lower elite 
stratum” from which the upper stratum is exclusively recruited. The reservoir (or 
reservoirs) of recruitment is an empirical question, rather than a pre-determined elite. 
On the other hand, inclusive government means that individuals from diverse, 
politically relevant segments of society occupy high executive office. This leads to the 
question of how to conceptualise politically relevant groups.  
In Liberia (as elsewhere), there has been a tendency to frame politics in ethnic terms. 
Although ethnic groups are no easier to delineate than the elite, this is a helpful starting 
point. The framing refers to the roughly 150 years before 1980 in which the Liberian state 
was dominated by the population segment labelled “Americo-Liberian” or “Congo”.2 Its 
counterpart is the population historically subsumed under the terms “tribal”, “native”, 
“country people” or “indigenous”, the latter being the least pejorative term. This part of 
the population is often, and probably increasingly, differentiated into the officially 
sixteen “tribes of Liberia”. As oligarchic rule tends to be considered synonymous with 
“Americo-Liberian” rule in popular Liberian thought, investigating whether the 
executive elite includes to a significant degree individuals from “indigenous” 
backgrounds provides first clues as to the inclusive character of Liberia’s “governing 
                                                     
2 „Americo-Liberian“, previously an accepted self-identification, became unfashionable during 
the reign of President William V.S. Tubman (1944-1971) as he tried to mitigate the division 
between long-distance immigrants and “indigenous” groups (of which many immigrated into 
contemporary Liberia about the same time as the “free men of color” from the US). 
“Repatriates” is sometimes, in particular in formal settings, used as a substitute but the term 
tended to be replaced by the notion of „civilized elements“. The expression omits any reference 
to ancestral origin and stresses culture, and is nowadays a category widely perceived as trans-
ethnic. Still frequently used to label perceived settler descendants in ethnic terms is the 
pejorative notion “Congo”. It initially referred to “recaptives”, Africans seized by the US Navy 
from illegal slave cargo ships and brought to Liberia. These “Congoes” were fully assimilated 
into “Americo-Liberian” society and do not exist as a separate social category anymore. 
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elite”. Further analysing the cabinet in terms of regional origin can provide a more 
nuanced picture of the ethno-regional composition of the elite.  
There are, however, significant ambiguities in the definitions of “Americo-Liberian” 
and “indigenous” complicating the picture. Generally, ethnic groups are social 
constructs, and as “imagined communities” may undergo substantial change in 
characteristics and boundaries. Ethnic groups are social categories that are both self-
defined on the basis of symbols of community, and defined from outside by attributing 
symbols of group identity (cf. Anderson 1996; Elwert 1989). Ethnic groups may be an 
elite in Mosca’s sense when they are identified with symbols acting simultaneously as 
elite credentials – in particular, modern education, a specific religion, specific political 
beliefs, and even specific norms of social intercourse. As such, they are culturally defined 
and thus variable groupings. Yet (believed) common ancestry is one of the most 
important symbols in ethnic group identity. This contradiction between de-facto cultural 
and perceived biological definition underlies many of the ambiguities observable in 
present-day Liberia.  
This is reinforced by the ambiguity of cultural symbols, in particular the cluster of 
symbols termed “civilized” in Liberia (and elsewhere). The term itself is partly framed in 
biological terms. Among indigenous groups, “kwi”, which initially referred to “whites” 
or “Europeans”, developed as its equivalent. “Kwi” became associated with the African-
American settlers and came to be understood as a status that could be achieved. As such, 
it was associated with education, the English language, Christianity, and other cultural 
features. However, it served similarly to identify elites that did not match any essential 
definition of the term with socially appreciated qualities (Brown 1982).  
By and large, politics and society in Liberia are not overly ethnicised, and it is little 
promising to try measuring political inclusivity by investigating ethnic 
representativeness. There are innumerable distinctions in every society only few of 
which become politicised, and political developments in a given society decide best 
which ones can be considered relevant. Investigating recruitment criteria promises to 
better point to hidden mechanisms of elite closure. When investigating political 
representativeness of the elite, in addition to the classic “Americo-Liberian” vs. 
“indigenous” categories, political organizations should form the basis. Of major 
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importance among these were the warring parties of the recent Liberian war, as all of 
them established effective patterns of sovereign or non-sovereign domination. In as 
much as these were associated with political parties either directly or by sharing the 
same social basis, these political parties will be included in the analysis. By contrast, 
most political parties of the 2005 elections were founded or resurrected only shortly 
before the elections, where characterized by major shifts in their political leaderships and 
alliances and were too little institutionalized to be representing any minimally stable 
political segment. Indeed most proved politically irrelevant in the elections.  
Crucial for determining the openness of the elite system for people from different 
social and regional backgrounds are the criteria applied for recruitment into the political 
elite.3 A key question that has classically intrigued elite scholars is to what extent elite 
positions are reserved for the elites’ offspring, i.e. to what extent high social status is a 
credential for elite recruitment or to what extent it is associated with important 
credentials, respectively. In comparative perspective, narrow and ascriptive criteria 
historically dominated recruitment in diverse societies. Examples of frequently found 
recruitment criteria or credentials are personal trust, family ties, education, backing from 
corporate groups, and influence with or control over specific groups. Historically, when 
purchase of office was widespread, wealth was a key criterion. Wealth still is a powerful 
resource but tends to work indirectly by being used to buy credentials – education, 
prestige, contacts. Nowadays, “pure market mechanisms of selection are relatively rare“ 
(Putnam 1976: 52). High social status can directly or indirectly increase chances of 
recruitment, the latter in particular by overlapping with eminent family membership 
and by providing social capital in the form of elite contacts that can generate trust and 
inform personal recommendations. “Patron-client affiliations and personal 
recommendations are virtually universal credentials for recruitment” (Putnam 1976: 61; 
italics omitted). 
Inherited high social status is a condition underlying a number of other ascriptive 
criteria. A political elite recruited exclusively from high status families is synonymous 
with a self-perpetuating oligarchy. When a high number of elites comes from eminent 
                                                     
3 For a comparative overview of elite recruitment, see Putnam (1976: 45-70). 
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families, this indicates a closed elite system. Merit is popularly understood as an 
opposing principle, subsuming a number of achievement criteria. Of these, two are 
particularly noteworthy: votes and education. In democratic systems, votes can be 
considered the very currency measuring political achievement. They indicate 
achievement in political efforts to garner grassroots support and earn popularity.4 The 
importance of education as a political qualification is legitimized with reference to the 
complexity of the tasks modern day politicians are facing. High education is equated 
with the ability to deliver what is expected of politicians. As it is in principle dependent 
on personal effort rather than ascriptive criteria, it is associated with open elite systems. 
As such, it is the classical liberal justification for inequalities. Yet family social status, 
education, and elite position are interlinked. 
“Education, especially university education, distinguishes elites from non-elites 
throughout the world“ (Putnam 1976: 58). The importance of education seems greatest in 
Third World countries, where the gap between average elite education and average 
education is far greater than in the OECD (Putnam 1976: 27). As for Africa, the 
importance of education as a criterion for elite recruitment – with university education in 
early post-colonial times virtually guaranteeing high political or senior civil service office 
– has repeatedly been noted (cf. Hauck 1965). This, however, cannot be considered to 
indicate openness of African elite systems. Several models have been de3veloepd to 
visualize the association between high-status family background increases chances to 
obtain an elite position both independently and by positively impacting on access to 
education (Image 1).  
Of course, these relations are more mediated, and for reasons of clarity of 
mechanisms, these can be portrayed in a refined model. Image 2 shows the main 
variables and mechanisms used in this paper’s analysis to investigate the Liberian elite. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
44 However, elite scholars have historically focused on selectorates rather than the electorate, 
emphasizing that small groups have a disproportionate impact on selecting elites. 
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Image 2 argues that 
• High family status is a function of wealth, elite culture, and elite connections but 
works as well as an independent variable transmitting same by way of 
inheritance and socialization. 
• Wealth is used to buy high quality education 
• Elite culture nurtures ambition, increases intrinsic motivations to succeed in 
higher learning and values discipline in learning. It thus contributes to obtain 
high quality education. 
• Elite culture includes values and worldviews increasing chances that an 
individual will hold opinions in line with established parameters and vested elite 
interests and thus generates elite trust. 
• Elite connections increase chances that personal relations involving trust are 
established with people in political elite position. 
• People in political elite positions recruit junior elites on the basis of personal trust 
on the one hand and education on the other. 
• Elite positions offer access to wealth, continued socialization into elite culture, 
and further elite contacts that engender a high social status for the elite’s family. 
 
 
  
Image 1: Recruitment Credentials Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Putnam (1976: 30-31) 
Edu-
cation 
High 
Status 
Family 
Elite 
Position 
 11 
 
  
Image 2: Oligarchic Elite Recruitment Model 
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Much as education as a credential for elite recruitment seems to indicate free, 
meritocratic competition for elite status, democratic elections appear to assure free 
competition for high political office. However, although democratic procedures may 
allow formerly excluded individuals to rise, political elites in democratic systems tend to 
come from privileged social backgrounds (Putnam 1976: 171-173). Processes of elite 
perpetuation as described above work in democratic systems, too, in particular because 
selectorates are often significantly smaller than electorates and tend to value credentials 
giving an advantage to individuals from high social status families.  
In the African setting analysed here, additional variables are of particular 
importance, as the relation between wealth, social status and votes is particularly direct 
(cf. Daloz 2003; cf. Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). A pattern characterizing, inter alia, African 
societies (and, as I will argue below, post-war societies in particular) is the salient role of 
political patron-client relationships. In these systems patron services, in particular 
protection and material assistance, are exchanged against political loyalty, and in 
democratic settings, against votes. Further, many developing societies are characterized 
by culturally legitimized systems of privilege (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). High social status 
and the associated prestige thus have a relatively important though varying impact on 
voters’ decisions. Image 3 depicts how social status and elite position are linked in 
democratic systems characterised by patronage networks and traditional patterns of 
deference.  
Of course, the aim of the models is to guide the analysis, rather than portraying elite 
systems as intrinsically closed. They are equally useful to tell whether an elite system is 
open by investigating to what extent elite formation in the case study deviated from the 
models. 
The importance of patron-client relations indicates the neo-patrimonial character of 
many developing country states. The concept of neo-patrimonialism, which I use here to 
describe the structure in which political elites are organised, is of particular relevance for 
post-war countries. In Africa and particularly in countries emerging from civil war, 
bureaucratic principles were weakly developed historically, and patrimonial principles 
dominated in the administration of power (cf. Reno 1998). Moreover, during civil wars 
bureaucratic state institutions are weakened, the formal economy crumbles, and the 
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educational environment deteriorates, the latter two being pillars of bureaucratic 
organization. Where opposition parties are suppressed, dissidents operate in informal 
underground organizations and are denied access to competition for elite status. When 
the power of authoritarian governments is broken, these and new political organizations 
enter the public sphere, creating a little structured party environment. Further, rebel 
groups tend to be characterized by informal patterns of organization and constitute 
channels for career advancement specific to post-war societies. War-typical political 
organizations thus share with neo-patrimonialism the predominance of informal 
patterns. 
 
 
  
Image 3: Closed Elite Recruitment Model – Neo-patrimonial Democracy 
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Given this hardly institutionalized environment of post-war societies, we 
propose to investigate elite systems from a political economy perspective rooted in 
the neo-patrimonial paradigm. The notion of neo-patrimonialism is based on Max 
Weber’s political sociology of legitimate domination (Weber 1978a; 1978b). Weber 
conceived patrimonialism as a sub-type of traditional domination yet we 
emphasise its dynamic character. Patrimonial authority is the product of the 
extension of patriarchal authority beyond the oikos. Personal patterns 
characteristic of the oikos also structure the administration necessary to exercise 
authority over the larger patrimony (Weber 1978b: 1010). Patrimonialism can thus 
be considered a typical mode of exercising political power in situations where 
localised clusters of authority are progressively integrated into a central apparatus 
of domination, as is the case when state authority is rebuilt. 
At the core of the notion of patrimonialism are the private disposition over 
“public” offices and personal relations as channels of exercising authority. There is 
no distinction between public and private spheres and positions of authority are 
treated as private economic opportunities. There are, however, important 
differences in the extent to which the central ruler controls spoils of office he 
allocates discretionarily to staff, and to what extent the staff have effectively 
appropriated rights to use their positions for their private economic benefit. The 
ruler and his staff are linked through personal relations. Thus, being based on 
private material interest of power holders and inter-personal channels of 
communication, patrimonialism needs few preconditions and allows a rapid re-
extension of central authority. In contrast, bureaucratic organization necessitates 
relatively high levels of education, a large body of regulations and written 
standard operating procedures, specialized training, significant centrally 
controlled financial means, and a number of other features that may take 
generations to develop. 
In comparative politics, Weber’s ideal-type has been reformulated as neo-
patrimonialism, understood as domination in a formally bureaucratically 
organized state characterized by highly personalised government and 
administration (cf. Erdmann/Engel 2007: 97-104). The administration to a large 
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extent is a personal instrument of power holders and serves personal purposes, in 
particular imposition of personal authority and private enrichment. Persons with 
informal or officially non-executive positions, for instance presidential advisors, 
may effectively occupy high authoritative positions in the government hierarchy 
(cf. Pawelka 1985). Extent of central power and forms of appropriation are closely 
related and vary widely empirically. Powerful neo-patrimonial presidents tend to 
control all spoils of power and personally distribute them to clients, while less 
powerful ones have to contend with clients privately appropriating state powers 
on their own. As the political and economic spheres are interlinked in the sense 
that political power is a major economic opportunity, the state is the major locus of 
elite reproduction. This implies that state power is the major object of elite 
competition. Yet political, administrative and economic spheres are intertwined. 
Thus, straddling and concatenation, i.e. accumulation of or switching between 
positions in different sectors are typical elite trajectories (Bayart 1993; Daloz 2003). 
However, neo-patrimonial systems are as well characterized by the presence of 
bureaucratic elements. Often, formal hierarchies and spheres of responsibility tend 
to effectively define powers and restrict the scope of authority, stabilizing 
administrative practice relative to the fluid character of relations of authority in 
purely patrimonial settings. Other features may be added, for instance office 
powers may not exclusively be exercised for private power and enrichment. As 
well, an essentially neo-patrimonially organized state does not rule out the 
possibility of a project of bureaucratization. Bureaucratization promises to increase 
political stability and spur economic growth and potential revenue, and may thus 
appear attractive to central rulers. However, as large parts of the political and 
administrative elite realize opportunities within the neo-patrimonial parameters 
and profit from privatization of office, bureaucratization is likely to face resistance, 
too. 
Co-optation into clientelistic networks is the dominant mode of elite 
recruitment. Concerning staffing of the executive branch in neo-patrimonial 
systems, selectorates tend to be small. They may consist of the president only but 
more frequently involve her confidantes and Big Men. Clientelism is based on 
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dyadic ties between a higher status patron and lower status client exchanging 
material privileges and favours.  Their relationship is characterized by reciprocity 
and mutual if unequal benefits. Typically, the patron appropriates public offices 
and resources and distributes them among his clients, for which they provide him 
with personal services of all sorts. In larger hierarchical systems such as the state, 
dyadic patron-client relationships combine to form a vertically structured, 
pyramidal network. In such a clientelistic pyramid, clients of top-level patrons 
themselves take on the role of patrons vis-à-vis lower status clients.  
Co-optation may follow different rationales. An important one is the 
recognition of established, de-facto fiefs, meaning that individuals who have 
established an informal position of personal power are co-opted. This informal 
position of power may be based on accumulated social, material, or cultural 
capital. In empirical terms, it is often based on local military control, popular 
support, intra-elite connections, or wealth. Co-opting strongmen tends to result in 
a de-centralized neo-patrimonialism, where subaltern elites hold considerable 
independent power. A contrasting principle is allocation of offices on the basis of 
personal trust of the ruler. Family relations, friendship and common communal 
background (in Simmel’s sense) typically pattern elite recruitment in this case. Co-
optation on the basis of personal trust promotes a centralized neo-patrimonial 
system. 
Post-war societies can be characterized as a social space (in Bourdieu’s sense) 
with specific opportunity structures. These opportunity structures typically feature 
two, and often more, relatively independent political actors that have accumulated 
powers in forms of arms or coercive potential, control over financial means 
allowing to sustain the organisation, relations of authority, and support in larger or 
more narrow segments of society. One or some of these typically are led by 
formerly marginalized elites or individuals characterized by status inconsistency – 
typically high education and low social status (cf. Putnam 1976: 191-195; cf. 
Wimmer 1995) – that enjoy particular chances to rise to elite positions. Wars often 
entail the collapse of sectors of the economy – typically those dependent on high 
capital investment and requiring long-time horizons – which may engender the fall 
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of parts of the old elite and render the elite system instable or more dynamic. 
Further, individuals from the diaspora often see chances to rise, due to superior 
opportunities of exile to acquire education, financial means, and international as 
well as intra-diaspora contacts. The diaspora often is made up of both previous 
and new or aspiring elites yet all of which are partly socialized in a foreign political 
environment and may introduce political innovations at home. 
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3. The Political Elite of Liberia  
Liberia is characterized by a particular history of state formation and consequently, 
processes of elite formation deviated from experiences of other states in the region. 
Since the country declared independence in 1847, extending and consolidating 
state power had been the project of a settler community of US-American slave 
background. Until 1980, the state was dominated by descendants of settlers 
maintaining a strict cultural barrier distinguishing them from the indigenous 
population. Although it hardly structured political conflict as expressed in 
organizations such as warring factions and political parties since then, the cleavage 
between settler descendants and indigenous groups still very much informs 
interpretations of political conflict. Thus, the question whether Liberia’s elite is 
open or closed is very much debated with reference to the status of Liberia’s 
historic oligarchy. Any analysis thus has to take into account the long-term 
perspective of elite formation in Liberia. This chapter thus first describes major 
trends of elite formation in Liberia. I subsequently shortly outline the impact of 
military coup and war, before finally analysing Liberia’s first regular post-war 
government.  
3.1 Historical Overview: Elites and Populace in Liberia 
Liberia’s elite and the Americo-Liberian segment are frequently understood as 
synonymous. Yet by interpreting socio-political stratification primarily through the lens 
of ethnicity, changes in the social background of Liberia’s elites and changes in the 
Americo-Liberian segment relevant for same are obscured. By providing an overview 
over historic elite formation in Liberia, this section is intended to make explicit the 
ambiguities and contradictions of elite formation. Prime among these contradictions is 
the simultaneous existence of institutionalised and significant opportunities for social 
advancement, and a strict cultural barrier between those eligible for elite status (or the 
elite in Mosca’s sense) and the majority of the population. The historical overview of elite 
formation on the one hand allows to better gauge the extent of changes observable in the 
post-war situation and on the other alerts to the dangers of interpreting phenomena of 
authoritarian rule and exploitation in ethnic terms. 
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Liberia was created in the 1820s as a project of the private American Colonization 
Society (ACS) responding to fears the increasing number of “free men of color” could 
destabilize US American society (Finzsch 2001). In 1847, Liberia declared its 
independence, and power was formally taken over by leaders of the settlers that had 
effectively assumed responsibility for the polity for several years already. From the 
beginning, there were pronounced social disparities within the settler community. The 
early leadership was composed of mulattos, mostly the illegitimate offspring of masters 
and slave women. Most were free-born or had been free for considerable time in the US, 
had enjoyed relatively good access to education, and had succeeded to accumulate some 
capital before coming to Liberia. The lower stratum was overwhelmingly made up of 
former rural slaves, mostly manumitted only on condition they emigrate.  
The first (and seventh) President of Liberia, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, reportedly was 
the free-born son of a white farmer and an eventually manumitted mulatto mistress. The 
man who later became his step-father was a free black owning a boating business. When 
Jenkins emigrated at the age of 19, he disposed of private business experience, roughly 
1,000 US Dollars, and connections helpful to both obtain additional cash and establish a 
shipping business (Syfert 1975: 114). Generally, Liberia’s elite at the time of 
independence had been born free, had received some education before coming to 
Liberia, had arrived early, and simultaneously occupied political office and engaged in 
commerce (Syfert 1975). Further, elites were based in Monrovia rather than in one of the 
other settlements upriver or eastwards down the coast (Sawyer 1992). While not fully 
taking into account the constraints of politics in Liberia’s situation, the following quote 
of a US American black nationalist visiting Liberia is instructive as to early social 
stratification and hints at elite closure.    
“Faithful to the trust reposed in him by his American white masters, this man [Joseph 
Jenkins] Roberts discards the people who he feigns to represent, considering it a 
condescension to do so, spurns at the idea of reporting to them the results of his mission, but 
as serf to his lord, considers it an honor and special privilege to submit his doings first to a 
 20 
 
white man, hence, that malignant libeller [sic] of our race, A.G. Phelps, was selected and 
reported to, over the heads of his country and his people” (quoted in Finzsch 2001: 51).5 
Corresponding to the formation of an upper stratum socialising and communicating 
among its members first of all, a lower stratum of people with significantly restricted 
opportunities formed that, however, was still clearly superior in status to indigenous 
peoples, as the following quote indicates: 
“We are dissatisfide [dissatisfied] in this place that there is Some that hav[e] come to this 
place that hav[e] got rich and anumber [sic], that are suf[f]ering those that are well off do 
hav[e] the nativ[e]s as Slav[e]s and poor people that come from america [sic] hav[e] no chance 
to make aliving [sic] for the nativ[e]s do all the work” (quoted in Finzsch 2001: 52). 
In addition to the “poor people that come from America”, another distinguishable 
population segment occupied positions on the bottom of settler society. These were the 
so-called “Congoes”,6 human cargo from illegally operating slave ships seized by the US 
navy and “liberated” in Liberia. “Congoes” were generally allocated to settler 
households as apprentices and assimilated into “Americo-Liberian” culture.7 “Congo” 
over time became the popular if pejorative term for anyone of settler descent, and may as 
well refer to assimilated indigenous individuals.   
Partly reflecting the divide between rich and poor, Liberia’s early (internal) political 
conflicts were expressed and organized on the basis of complexion. In formally 
democratically constituted Liberia, this manifested itself eventually in alternance of 
power from the “mulatto” Republican Party to the “black” True Whig Party (TWP). 
President Edward J. Royce (1870-1871) is considered the first “black” President of 
Liberia, and his rise indicates significant shifts in the distribution of power. However, 
like his predecessors he came from a relatively privileged background in the US. 
President Hilary Wright Johnson (1884-1892) was the first President born in Liberia, 
                                                     
5 This and the following quote have been reproduced as printed in Finzsch (2001), including the bracketed 
additions. 
6 The term referred to the presumed origin of many of the would-be slaves, the Congo basin. 
7 Roughly 15,000 „free people of color“ were shipped from the US to Liberia between 1821 and 1860 
(Dunn/Holsoe 1985:8) , more than half of which may have died within years of arrival due to battles and 
diseases (cf. Pham 2004: 12-13). In addition, some 5,750 „Congoes“ were brought to Liberia, 4,700 of 
which arrived in 1860 alone (Yoder 2003: 122). 
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indicating the consolidation of a properly Liberian elite owing its status primarily to its 
position in domestic society. However, H.W. Johnsons was the son of Elijah Johnson, an 
eminent early settler with huge historical importance for the country. For almost a 
century, Liberia’s “governing elite” (in Pareto’s sense) was disproportionately composed 
of individuals from a number of political dynasties, i.e. families founded by settlers who 
had been among the early arrivals and had arrived with some resources in Liberia, thus 
enjoying a first mover advantage. This elite constituted itself as an informally organized 
oligarchy of “leading citizens”. 
“The group of leading citizens whose role circumscribed presidential prerogatives and whose 
leader, if not president, was more powerful than the president, also functioned as the 
’Legislative’ authority. This group usually included the president and his cabinet, leading 
and influential members of the legislature, former presidents, and others who were notable 
merchants and planters. Although this group had no standing in law, it was the final 
authority especially in times of national crises” (Sawyer 1992: 267). 
In the 20th century, Liberian state authority was extended over the hinterland first by 
way of indirect rule and later according to neo-patrimonial principles. This entailed the 
formation of an indigenous political elite owing its status to the Liberian state, the 
multiplication of contacts between the settler and the indigenous populations, and 
increased need for state administration staff. However, in terms of power and privilege, 
the two social environments showed pertinent similarities. Thus, Yoder (2003) argued 
that authoritarian and xenophobic tendencies characterized settler and indigenous 
societies, and contemporary Liberian political culture is an amalgam of these different 
strands. 
Liberia features two large traditional political-cultural clusters. The north-western 
half is historically characterized by relatively institutionalized, hierarchic patterns of rule 
in small-scale political communities. Some form of chieftaincy is considered the 
dominant pre-Liberian form in which political authority was organised. The south-east 
was identified with acephalous societies organized on palaver, gender and age group 
principles. 
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When the settlers arrived, the slave trade still dominated the economy of the region, 
with local groups partly raiding slaves and partly serving as intermediaries between 
raiders of the interior and foreign merchants. As was the case in large parts of Africa 
(Hauck 2001), political power was to a large extent based on proceeds of the slave trade 
on the one hand and exploitation of pawned and captive labour on the other. This points 
to the existence of a more or less consolidated elite characterized by military credentials, 
a middle stratum of free community members, and a lower class of pawns and captives.  
Both mitigated and legitimized by cultural-political institutions, exploitation and 
coercion were an intrinsic element of political success. Speaking of the pre-1930s, a Gola 
Chief reminisced:  
”If a chief wanted to raise himself in the world, he was forced to fight his own relatives and 
use the government to make them obey him. If you were good to your people, you were poor 
and no one listened to you” (quoted in Azevedo 1970-71: 7).  
The Americo-Liberian settlers progressively suppressed the slave trade and in the 
early 1930s ended the practice of pawning.8 The position of chiefs increasingly depended 
on backing of the Liberian state, and the government increasingly interfered with the 
staffing of chieftaincy positions and the political structure in general by creating new 
chieftaincy positions. Generally, chieftaincy positions in Liberia are state offices 
incorporated into the official state administration rather than traditional institutions. In 
return for their loyalty to government, chiefs had rights to a share of taxes they collected 
for the central state. Although partially restrained by traditional mechanisms, 
“indigenous” rule became more despotic during the 20th century. State-building in 
addition promoted elite closure, although arbitrary appointment of chiefs by the central 
state introduced a new element of change. Traditionally, success in warfare and raiding 
of other villages constituted the most important avenue for social rise of youths. As the 
                                                     
8 The settler authorities had early on fought the slave trade, inter alia because the fight promised 
international recognition and suppressing it would increase the volumes of legitimate trade in which 
Liberia’s merchants mostly engaged. Notwithstanding, highly placed settler elites were involved in 
domestic slavery and providing forced labour to other colonies, notably the Spanish one of Fernando Po. 
This entailed an international scandal that promoted European designs to establish a protectorate over 
Liberia. In reaction to the scandal, the Liberian government effectively moved against the widespread 
practice of pawning (cf. Johnston 1987, Azevedo 1969b: 58). 
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state imposed its monopoly on legitimate force, raiding became illegal and this road of 
advancement was blocked (cf. Liebenow 1969; cf. Ellis 1999; cf. Sawyer 1992). Chiefs 
increasingly monopolized opportunities by controlling access to land and women, in 
many cases denying youths the opportunity to rise in the rural hierarchy (cf. Richards 
2005). Acceptance of the rural social order by youths was weakened although rural 
inequality tends to be considered more legitimate than “Americo-Liberian” minority rule 
on the national level.9 
While social mobility within traditional society was restrained, three ways of rising 
socially by integrating with the Americo-Liberian society were offered: marriage, foster 
parentage, and state employment. In the 19th century, sexual relations between Americo-
Liberian men and indigenous women were frequent in the form of concubinage, with 
offspring generally being accepted and raised as household members. In the first half of 
the 20th century, it gradually became socially acceptable and more frequent for Americo-
Liberian males to marry indigenous women. In consequence, indigenous norms and 
beliefs subtly found their way into everyday Americo-Liberian life, and virtually every 
Liberian nowadays has some biological connection to indigenous peoples. As ethnicity is 
determined in patrilineal fashion in Liberia and children were socialized into Americo-
Liberian culture, the major socio-cultural distinction in Liberia could still be maintained 
(cf. Sawyer 1992).    
Since early settler times, settler families had raised children from indigenous families 
in their households in what came to be known as the ward system. The system 
responded to the need for labour by the settlers on the one hand and a need for 
increasing manpower to maintain the Americo-Liberian state. Some of the de-facto 
adoptions were purely exploitative, but the system generally offered indigenous 
children access to some education at least and the opportunity to learn about Americo-
Liberian culture. Assimilating into Americo-Liberian culture or becoming “civilized” 
was the precondition for social advancement. Many of those raised in settler households 
completely assimilated and cut off links to their ancestral communities as they integrated 
                                                     
9 However, a significant parts of youthful combatant violence in the particularly bloody first Liberian civil 
war was directed against those privileged in the traditional hierarchy, indicating that the social order 
lacked acceptance (Ellis 1999). 
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into urban Americo-Liberian life. While evident links to indigenous peoples were a 
hindrance to a career and this is part of the explanation, many indeed were socialized 
into settler culture and life to an extent that it created a rift with indigenous 
communities. Generally, the foster children had to adopt English names and convert to 
Christianity. The growth of the Americo-Liberian segment was in no small measure due 
to successfull assimilation. Yet, education being a key component of “civilization” and 
“Americo-Liberian” identity, missionary schools operating independently of the 
government offered some opportunities for social advancement. 
On the other hand, many kept part of their indigenous identity, or continued to be 
associated with indigenous communities in the eyes of Americo-Liberians. A few of 
these rose to high political office relatively earlier. Among the first and most prominent 
individuals considered indigenous despite extensive socialization into Americo-Liberian 
society were A. Momolu Massaquoi (1872-1938) and Didho Twe (1879-1961),10 both 
illustrating quite different trajectories. Massaquoi came from a chiefly family in a 
traditionally hierarchical setting, had privileged access to education, rose to become 
secretary of the interior, and observed generally accepted patterns of profiting from 
native labour rather than being an activist against exploitation (cf. Massaquoi 2000). 
Tweh, born in Monrovia to Kru parents in an apparently privileged environment, 
similarly had access to high quality education and rose to become a legislator. Yet he had 
opposed the President in the scandal over the export of forced labour, had to flee the 
country, and developed into a dissident trying to mobilise armed resistance (cf. 
Dunn/Holsoe 1985). 
Indigenous people had first been “employed” with the state as rank-and-file soldiers 
of the country’s militia and the army, with officer positions being reserved for Americo-
Liberians. Soldiers, the prime instrument of state exploitation, were generally unpaid 
and used to “live off the local community as much as traffic will bear” (Liebenow 1969: 
54). As access to education spread, more indigenous individuals were recruited into the 
expanding hinterland administration, presumably because of their perceived loyalty to 
local Americo-Liberian Big Men rather than their qualifications. These administrators 
                                                     
10 Massaquoi‘s first name was Albert but he was generally known as Momolu, appearing to indicate a 
conscious emphasis on his indigenous roots. 
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were deeply involved in exploitative practices in the hinterland, were extraction of 
values could be particularly severe given little oversight from Monrovia. Thus in the 
1960s, Liebenow warned that “until family, tribal, or regional affiliations develop as 
social restraining mechanisms in the politics of the interior, the exploitation of the 
uneducated tribal masses by their young evolved kinsmen may in the immediate future 
be even more relentless than the [Americo-Liberian] exploitation of the past” (Liebenow 
1969: 212). 
Yet, while indigenous elites assimilated to the Americo-Liberian Liberian ways, 
Americo-Liberian elites became integrated into traditional systems of power and 
religion. The chieftaincy system in north-western Liberia was embedded in wider 
cultural-religious systems, among which the Poro (for men) and Sande (for women) 
societies were of particular relevance because of their ubiquity. Increasingly, Liberian 
elites sought and were granted entry into the societies, giving them among others the 
opportunity to use local magical knowledge. President William Tubman (reign 1944-
1971), considered to have established Africa’s first neo-patrimonial state (Richards et al. 
2005), was known to have been inaugurated as the head of Poro societies (Ellis 2010). As 
the Americo-Liberian elite became indigenized, the notion of “civilization” (acting as a 
credential for elite recruitment and a marker of distinction) was defined in ambivalent 
but politically instrumental fashion (cf. Brown 1982).  
Since the late 1960s, Liberia’s buoyant national resource economy showed signs of a 
slowdown. The political repercussions hit when William Tolbert (1971-1980) took over 
the presidency after the death of Tubman. As state and economy could not continue to 
absorb dissent by expanding employment, dissent was increasingly articulated from 
both Americo-Liberian elements, many though not all from lower status backgrounds, 
and educated indigenous individuals. Oppositional “progressive” movements were 
formed, uniting on the leadership level both population segments briefly and reaching 
out to uneducated masses.11 A riot instigated by one of the opposition movements and 
                                                     
11 In particular, the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) identified with its „indigenous“ Chairman Togba 
Nah Tipoteh and the prominent Americo-Liberian activist Amos Sawyer became renowned for its „night 
schools“ in which lower stratum Liberians were educated and politically mobilized. Tipoteh, considered 
to be of Kru ethnicity, was given the name Rudolph Nah Roberts by his parents. The fact that he made his 
career with a chosen name emphasising his indigenous roots indicated substantial socio-political change 
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subsequent military action provided the background to the military coup of Master-
Sergeant Samuel Doe and other non-commissioned officers in 1980. 
The coup shook Liberia’s elites. The President and thirteen prominent Americo-
Liberian elites were killed. Samuel Doe initially tried to establish a broad-based 
government, offering integration to progressive leaders and, as time went on, 
increasingly to Americo-Liberian members of the old elite. Yet as criticism mounted, rule 
became thoroughly authoritarian, and the progressives as well as fellow coup makers 
were marginalized or killed. Individuals from the president’s own minute Krahn ethnic 
group (from eastern Grand Gedeh) were increasingly propelled into government 
positions. Eventually in 1989, Samuel Doe was challenged by Charles Taylor’s NPFL. At 
that point in time, he had already lost virtually all the domestic support he formerly 
enjoyed. However, the reign of Doe had thoroughly destroyed any pretension that 
power could continue to be monopolized by an essentially Americo-Liberian oligarchy.   
Thus, social mobility in Liberia is historically characterized by many ambiguities. 
While a relatively small group of “leading citizens” tended to monopolize opportunities, 
lower status Americo-Liberians could legitimately aspire to obtain positions of political 
authority and some opportunities were accessible even to the generally disadvantaged 
indigenous population. While elite perpetuation largely followed the model depicted in 
Image 2, elite closure was broken in particular by free (missionary) education and the 
ward system. The effects of both were reinforced by needs related to the tremendous 
growth of the Liberian state and the expansion of the natural resource economy during 
the first 160 years-or-so of Liberia’s existence. In the long run, this has enabled 
discernible changes in Liberia’s elite.12 Although comprehensive evidence is lacking, 
there are indications that social rise tended to take place over generations, and among 
the indigenous population segment it were individuals from privileged backgrounds – 
born to families of chiefs, successful traders, and state administration employees – that 
                                                                                                                                                              
in Liberia. The other major „progressive“ movement was the „Progressive Alliance of Liberia“ (PAL) 
identified with the Americo-Liberian Gabriel Bacchus Matthews and the Krahn Chea Cheapoo.  
12 For instance, the family names of past presidents and of the 81 great merchants (1822-1847) (many of 
which held political office, too) analysed by Seyfert (1975) are not particularly prominent among Liberia’s 
contemporary elite, although often one or two members of these (very large) families either occupy senior 
state positions or are prominent in other sectors of society. On rise of new and fall of old families see as 
well Liebenow (1969: 131-147). 
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tended to rise further in Americo-Liberian society.  And while historically opportunities 
were concentrated with the Americo-Liberian segment, framing privilege in ethnic terms 
is of limited value analytically as boundaries of that population segment were not static 
and marked social disparities existed within the indigenous population, too. There is 
little to indicate that more ethnic representativeness would per se equal less exploitation.   
3.2 Elites of War 
Between 1989 and 2003, Liberia was the scene of two civil wars. While this is not the 
place to comprehensively analyse elite formation in war, this section is intended to show 
that the wars entailed a shake-up of the elite system. In consequence, the elections of 
2005 were characterized by a relatively level playing field not patterned by entrenched 
positions of power.  
In the first war from 1989 to 1996, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by 
Charles Taylor initially fought the Doe government. When the president was killed, the 
war developed into one between the NPFL, several irregular factions linked to former 
regime elites, and a Nigerian-led regional intervention force protecting a civilian 
government. In the course of the war, the Doe regime elites lost their positions and 
influence, although some – Alhadji Kromah, George Boley, Col. Hezekiah Bowen, 
Roosevelt Johnson – should be able to maintain an insecure politically relevant position 
as heads of relatively weak armed factions. Official government positions were taken 
over by civilians, predominantly the previously marginalized prominent progressive 
activists as symbolized by Interim President Amos Sawyer. 
The central figure of the war, Charles Taylor, exemplifies many of the ambiguities of 
Liberia’s Americo-Liberian segment. He was born to an Americo-Liberian father and a 
Gola mother in an upriver settlement close to the capital. These “upriver boys” tended to 
have a rather low status within Americo-Liberian society, and Taylor’s family was not 
particularly privileged (Liberty 1998). Neither did he have any substantive connection to 
his mother’s community – Taylor is said to have tried learning Gola late when he 
discovered the political advantages of being able to sport some indigenous roots but to 
never have gone far.  
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He however received western education in Liberia, studied economics on the BA 
level in the US, and became Chairman of the board of the US diaspora umbrella body, 
the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA). Through his “indigenous” then-
wife, he was related to one of the 1980 coup makers, an “indigene” Gio from Nimba 
County. Taylor in consequence was appointed to a cabinet position but fled Liberia 
when his patron got into conflict with the President, and started organizing his rebel 
movement. A few Americo-Liberians of varying social status and Nimba county 
indigenes featured prominently in the rebel group, but the NPFL essentially was a multi-
ethnic group.13  
At the end of the war, the NPFL was transformed into the National Patriotic Party 
(NPP). Taylor ruled Liberia as sovereign President from 1997 until he was forced out by 
another rebellion in 2003. Proven long-term loyalists occupied senior positions in the 
government Charles Taylor led. The government initially integrated individuals from 
relatively diverse segments of society, but it got significantly more exclusive soon as 
dissident activities increased. By and large, Taylor regime elites had made their career 
under circumstances of war and their ability to successfully adapt to these exceptional 
circumstances, rather than classic mechanisms of elite closure.  
The two rebel movements that challenged Charles Taylor in the war from 2000 to 
2003, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) emerged out of armed factions of the first civil war linked 
to the Doe regime. By 2000, they had hardly any bases of power in Liberian society. They 
could nevertheless successfully advance against Taylor due to support from Guinea and 
Côte d’Ivoire and weaknesses of Taylor’s apparatus of power. However, foreign support 
was unsustainable as a resource and could not be converted into consolidation of 
political elite positions. Besieged militarily and facing imminent defeat, rebels and 
government eventually entered into negotiations in June 2003. The rebels’ power being 
                                                     
13 Prominent Americo-Liberians in the NPFL were John T. Richardson, Emmanuel Shaw, Benoni 
Urey, and Oscar and Maurice Cooper. The Richardsons and Coopers are well-established 
Liberian elite families yet the Shaws and Ureys were historically less eminent – no Shaw or 
Urey made it into the Historical Dictionary of Liberia (Dunn/Holsoe 1985) – and appear to owe 
much of their careers to the war.  
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reinforced by an international arrest warrant against Charles Taylor,14 the President 
eventually went into Nigerian exile, opening the way for a reconfiguration of elites. 
3.3 Post-War Elite Formation 
3.3.1 The Interim Period 
As the rebels stood few chances of consolidating power on their own and in defiance of 
the “international community”, they pursued a compromise solution. In order to secure 
international support for a post-war regime necessary to stabilize the situation, civilian 
political actors were accepted on board on pressures of the international community.15 
The solution eventually agreed on meant improved security for the actors concerned.  
While they had to share power, access to spoils of power was guaranteed for a two year 
period as an external intervention force would provide regime security.16 General 
elections at the end of this period would determine the next President and the 
legislature. 
The terms of the 2003 peace agreement prevented the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, 
the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislature, and principal cabinet Ministers of 
the NTGL from running for elective office in 2005 (CPA 2003: Art. XXIV + XXV). On the 
one hand, this prevented warlords from using senior government positions to 
accumulate financial and social capital while on the other, it promoted short time 
horizons among NTGL elites. Finally, a large share of NTGL elites eligible for office 
stood in the elections. Some warring faction elites who had remained in the background 
during the transitional period because of the elective constraints ran for the presidency, 
notably Roland Massaquoi (NPP) and Sekou Conneh (LURD). Alhadji Kromah, who led 
a Mandingo faction during the First Liberian War, similarly sought the presidency. The 
majority of Transitional Legislative Assembly (TLA) members ran for legislative seats but 
few NTGL elites won. The subsequent analysis however focuses on the executive branch. 
                                                     
14 Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for responsibility for war crimes in 
the neighbouring country. 
15 Yet some ten of the eighteen parties represented at the peace talks were considered close to or 
even created by Charles Taylor in preparation for the (eventually cancelled) presidential 
elections of 2003 (Hayner 2007: 12).  
16 The 15,000 troops strong United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was the largest peace-
keeping mission in the world in 2003/2004. 
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Concomitantly, determinants of political success changed from military power to 
electoral appeal. Political elites in positions of authority in the interim period interested 
in a post-transition political career had to adapt to this changing environment. 
Historically, there had been pronounced tendencies of elites dissociating from grassroots 
constituencies, and machinations of the electoral process figured prominently among the 
strategies used to maintain power. There is some evidence to suggest that a significant 
share of Liberian elites historically considered investment in supernatural forces a 
promising way to gain or maintain political power (Ellis 2010). Transition government 
elites thus could not be expected to adapt smoothly to democratization, i.e. they could 
not be expected to enter competition for votes by building and cultivating a 
constituency. Accordingly, the NTGL period was characterized by private appropriation 
of state revenues yet few politicians succeeded or even tried to cultivate a constituency. 
This gave resource-poor community activists an opportunity to gain favour, which 
should prove particularly relevant in the legislative elections. 
Twenty-two candidates competed for the presidency in the first round of elections. 
The run-off pitted former world footballer George Weah against the international 
professional Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. None of the two were closely associated with a 
warring faction, although Johnson Sirleaf had supported the NPFL in the early 1990s. 
George Weah was widely considered the candidate of the poorly educated, indigenous 
masses and the youths in particular. Born and raised in a Monrovian slum, his formal 
education did not surpass high-school level by 2005, setting him markedly apart from 
Liberia’s historic Americo-liberian and indigenous elite. Weah is considered an ethnic 
Kru and had his strongholds in eastern Liberia where his family hailed from. Johnson 
Sirleaf however finally won the elections. 
3.3.2 The President: Who Is Ellen Johnson Sirleaf?17 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf exemplifies the ambiguities of Liberia’s elite in general and of the 
notion of Americo-Liberian in quite typical ways. To start with, she was considered 
Americo-Liberian and member of the historic elite by most Liberians but portrayed 
                                                     
17 This section is essentially based on Johnson Sirleaf’s (2009) autobiography yet information 
contained has been cross-checked as much as possible. 
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herself as being of indigenous origin during the election campaign of 2005.18 Her case 
further illustrates the hypothesis of a limited or mitigated impact of elite family 
background on policy preferences, i.e. a background in a privileged social environment 
is not necessarily associated with conservative policy preferences.19 
Johnson Sirleaf was born the daughter of J. Carney Johnson, an assimilated legislator 
of indigenous origin, and Martha Dunbar, the child of an indigenous woman and a 
German trader expelled never to be seen again in the context of World War II. After 
some twists and turns, Martha was eventually raised in the home of the eminent elite 
Dunbar family and took their name. Carney Johnson was the Child of a Gola Chief from 
an area close to the capital,20 who enjoyed a close relationship with then-President Hilary 
R.W. Johnson (1884-1892). Through this connection, Carney was eventually adopted into 
the elite McGrity family and renamed Johnson in reference to the President. He had 
access to Liberia’s best educational institutions, apprenticed law, became a “poor man’s 
lawyer”, as Johnson Sirleaf (2009: 11) stresses, and worked in the interior department for 
many years. Carney Johnson eventually became a member of the House of 
Representatives in 1943, but little is known about the circumstances. At the time, 
elections could not exactly be characterized as free and fair. Johnson Sirleaf’s father had a 
stroke when she was a teenager, and although he had entertained friendly personal 
relations with Liberia’s longest-serving President William Tubman (1944-1971), the 
family subsequently experienced economic difficulties and was socially relegated to the 
fringes of the elite. 
Johnson Sirleaf visited the primary school her mother had opened for reasons of 
status and distraction rather than generating revenues. She later went to the College of  
West Africa, a Methodist high school considered Liberia’s best secondary institution, “a 
                                                     
18 The campaign and her presidency may have changed perceptions of the President. 
19 Of course, it is debatable what „conservative“ in a country like Liberia means. Here, it refers to 
policies securing privileges of the established elite on the basis of patrimonial principles of 
governance.  
20 Johnson Sirleaf (2009: 261-262) on the one hand refers to Kormah in Montserrado County (close 
to the border with Bomi County) as her „ancestral home“ and place were both her father and 
grandfather were buried. This is consistent with Dunn/Holsoe (1985: 96). It however appears 
that Johnson Sirleaf’s grandfather, Chief Jahmale, lived in Julejuah village in Bomi County 
(Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 8). In the election campaigns of 2005 and 2011, Johnson Sirleaf designated 
Bomi as her home area, probably because it is considered the Gola county. Montserrado, which 
includes the capital, is identified with Americo-Liberians and it would constitute an electoral 
disadvantage to be closely identified with that segment. 
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school that only the privileged and well-connected could attend” (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 
27). Yet considering the road to further independent success blocked as her father lost his 
legislator status, she opted for a more traditional way of gaining status as an upper class 
wife (ibid: 29) and, at the age of seventeen, married a promising young Mandingo man 
educated at Tuskegee Institute in the US.21 However, success did not come quick and 
being rather disappointed about her prospects, Johnson Sirleaf became more ambitious. 
When her husband was awarded a scholarship for MA studies in the US, she strove to 
obtain one, too:  
“Had my father been alive and still a member of the legislature, the application 
would have been a mere formality, the scholarship given without hesitation or note. That 
was the way things worked”, Johnson Sirleaf explained, pointing out that given the 
circumstances, she had to “sit an exam and pleaded with anyone who would listen and 
might help, until finally the scholarship was granted” (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 33-34). Her 
ability to lobby with members of Liberia’s elite refers to the mechanism of elite 
reproduction through conversion of social capital into economic capital and ultimately 
education. After having studied business at BA level in the US, at the same time doing 
menial jobs to gain a living, Johnson Sirleaf returned to Liberia and was quickly 
employed in a middle level executive position at the Treasury Department. By then 
having four children, she divorced her husband, who had developed an alcohol problem 
and had become increasingly physically abusive. 
Her job and performance led to her being invited to a conference at Harvard in 1969, 
at which she linked Liberia’s economic slowdown to its “kleptocratic” system of 
governance. Concerned for her future and safety, the conference organizer persuaded 
her to stay in the US, promising to arrange a fellowship to Harvard for MA studies in a 
                                                     
21 Her husband, whose name Sirleaf (a westernized version of the indigenous name Sherif/Cherif) 
she still holds, was the son of a Mandingo father and a mother from the old elite Cooper family 
and thus quite familiar with Liberia’s Americo-Liberian environment. The young married 
couple lived with the Cooper mother for some time. It is of some relevance that Johnson Sirleaf 
married a man considered a Mandingo. The Islamic Mandingo, although present in the area for 
hundreds of years, form a distinct socio-ethnic group, tend to have an outsider status and are 
considered foreigners by most Liberians. The Americo-Liberian establishment entertained a 
historically ambivalent attitude to Mandingo (Liebenow 1969) and it was not fully accepted 
socially to marry one of them, but their relative isolation from indigenous societies as well 
drew them, in particular its large trader segment, closer to the upper stratum. Having been 
married to a Mandingo still helps Johnson Sirleaf to obtain political support from that segment. 
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department for professionals of developing countries. She passed an exam for a 
scholarship from the US Agency for International Development with excellent results, 
shored up her undergraduate credentials in economics at the University of Colorado, 
and went on to Harvard. On returning home when President William Tolbert took over, 
she was appointed Deputy Minister of Finance. Reacting to Liberia’s mounting crisis, 
Tolbert engaged in a project of controlled modernization, which included integrating 
younger and more innovative individuals into government. In 1972, she then held a 
famous speech at the College of West Africa, in which she strongly criticised elite 
violations of the constitution and Liberia’s system of privilege. The speech entailed a 
major clash with the more conservative members of government and her superior, 
Finance Minister Stephen Tolbert. Stephen Tolbert was a brother of the President and 
effective owner of the Mesurado Group of Companies, Liberia’s largest private corporation, 
and symbolized nepotisms and conflicts of interests in the government like hardly 
anyone else. Although not directly sanctioned, she was subsequently side-lined in her 
job. Johnson Sirleaf eventually resigned and took up a post with the World Bank in 1973. 
Stephen Tolbert died in a plane crash, and in 1977, she was invited back by his successor 
and served as Deputy Minister of Finance, although seconded by the World Bank. Two 
years later, she took over the post of Finance Minister in 1979 to occupy the position until 
the coup of 1980.  
Military President Samuel Doe then offered the post of president of the state-owned 
Liberian Bank for Development and Investment to Johnson Sirleaf, an offer she accepted. She 
however soon lost faith in the government, ran into conflict with a senior military official 
and, formally still employed with the World Bank, returned to the US. Since the coup she 
spent most time in exile and made an international career in the banking sector, first 
working in a senior position with Citibank. The job primarily involved negotiations with 
high-level government officials in Africa. In exile, Johnson Sirleaf developed into a 
prominent critic of the military government. As Liberia appeared set to democratize in 
the mid-1980s, she was one of the founding members of the Liberia Action Party (LAP), 
whose assimilated “indigenous” presidential candidate was widely considered to have 
 34 
 
won the 1985 elections.22 Like most other opposition candidates, she refused to take the 
Senate seat granted to her in protest at electoral fraud. Her activism several times put her 
life in acute danger, and led to her being incarcerated for limited periods twice. She 
eventually fled the country to the US, and took up a vice-presidential position at Equator 
Bank. In 1992, she was recruited by UNDP trying to attract more women into roles of 
leadership. During her professional time in the US, she as well made extensive contacts 
with members of the diaspora in the US and became a prominent member of the ULAA.  
Johnson Sirleaf had to give up the position when she ran as presidential candidate in 
the 1997 elections. Johnson Sirleaf came second with 9.6 per cent of votes, with Charles 
Taylor taking a commanding lead with about 75 per cent. She then went into Ivorian 
exile and established a private consultancy firm there, being helped by contacts acquired 
during her time at Equator Bank. The time of the reign of Charles Taylor as well saw her 
first somewhat timid attempts to establish a rural constituency and develop the 
reputation of a philanthropist. She founded a small NGO by the name of Measuagoon, 
and provided some 1,400 US$ to support rebuilding efforts in her ancestral village of 
Kormah (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 261). 
During her international career, Johnson Sirleaf came to intimately know a 
professional, rationally managed environment at the interstices of global politics and 
business. As well, Johnson Sirleaf would not have succeeded her international career had 
she not been exceptionally gifted, hard working, and unrelenting. However, her career 
as well unfolded on the basis of the privileged position she had been born into. Yet of 
major interest are her views of politics and society, and how these were affected by her 
trajectory.    
In contrast to many other children of her environment, Johnson Sirleaf was 
occasionally sent to her ancestral village by her father to stay there for about two-and-a-
half months. There, she “picked up a few words of Gola” (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 21) and 
                                                     
22 The candidate, Jackson Fiah Doe, had a quite typical background of “indigenous” elites”. He 
was the son of a Gio chief from Nimba working closely with the government and was raised in 
the home of Louis Arthur Grimes, one of the most eminent members of Liberia’s historic elite 
(cf. Dunn/Holsoe 1985; cf. Ellis 1999). J.F. Doe was killed during the first civil war, allegedly 
because he was a potential rival to Charles Taylor.  
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got at least an idea of indigenous life.23 Yet her cultural mind-set was basically formed in 
Liberia’s elite Americo-Liberian segment in general and the milieu of those close to 
power in particular, and she was socialized to internalize the cultural markers of 
distinction the Americo-Liberian elite cherished.  
“Above all else Grandma Cecilia [Dunbar] was a lady, with all that the word implies, 
and she wanted us to be ladies and gentlemen too. All that she had given my mother she 
also gave to us, teaching us how to dress, how to speak properly and politely, how to eat 
at the table with good manners and dignity”, Johnson Sirleaf (2009: 18) reminisced. Yet 
although born into a privileged position, she was not one of those whose position in 
society was intrinsically linked to maintaining the old order. Rather, she had experienced 
the massive social relegation of her family under the old order. This corresponds to the 
political position that should characterize her for her life. While feeling the way 
government was run deserved crititicism and needed change, her worldviews promoted 
incremental rather than revolutionary change, and her positions were quite in line with 
the formally paramount but often violated constitution. 
It was only when studying at Harvard that Johnson Sirleaf discovered the academic 
literature critically analysing Liberia’s trajectory. She eventually came “to realize that 
Liberia was not just a settler nation” and its history “was vastly more complex … than 
the Christianity-over-paganism paradigm we had been taught” (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 59-
60). The specifics of her criticisms of government – too much corruption, need of political 
power to successfully run a private business – appear very much informed by 
mainstream US American conceptions of politics. Indeed, it is generally recognized that 
foreign experiences have a discernible impact on elite political socialization, and 
frequently are the source of views isolating younger elites from mainstream domestic 
political thought. In this context, it is important that Johnson Sirleaf belonged to the first 
                                                     
23 Full community membership in the area is dependent on initiation in the Poro or Sande 
societies, and initiation thus is a crucial credential for being considered indigenous. In her 
autobiography, Johnson Sirleaf remains silent on the issue whether she has been initiated into 
the Sande. As well, this is an issue usually not discussed with outsiders. Ambullai Johnson, a 
cousin of hers who was her first Interior Minister, declared to be a member of the Poro society 
during his confirmation hearing in the Senate (News 10 February 2006). Interestingly, the 
instance indicated that initiation was becoming an elite credential. By the same token, “it  is 
worth mentioning that the re-legitimization of the Sande in Liberian society has been fostered 
by the current President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who courted the Sande network as one of her 
constituencies in the run-up to the elections in 2005“ (Fuehst 2009: 134).  
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Liberian elite generation that acquired education abroad on a significant scale. Further, it 
may have been of particular importance that the first time she publicly criticised her 
government in unequivocal terms at the Harvard conference, she was not sanctioned but 
rewarded. By and large, her international career owed much to her willingness to hold 
and voice her dissenting opinion.  
However, Johnson Sirleaf remained bound to the basic framework of capitalist, 
bureaucratic and liberal-democratic rule formally characterizing Liberia since 
independence. Many of her generation educated abroad in contrast had embraced the 
ideas of African socialism – in ideological or rather populist fashion – sweeping the 
continent at the time. They established the “progressive” movements that were to 
fundamentally challenge Liberia’s socio-political order. When these started mobilizing 
the masses to march in the streets in the late 1970s, Johnson Sirleaf watched from her 
window in anxiety, “looking down as the world [she] knew began to break apart” 
(Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 87).24 Still, Johnson Sirleaf failed to see the depth of the cleavage in 
her society so well described in some of the books she read at Harvard.25 Speaking of the 
coup and the Samuel Doe government’s orientation, she wonders:   
“Over the years before 1980, we had known there was a cleavage there. We knew there was 
resentment, and by the late 1970s we knew it had been politicized and radicalized. But 
generally people lived together and worked together and prayed together. Nobody really saw 
that the division ran so deep it would spill over into hatred – violent, boiling hatred. That’s 
what surprised everybody – the extent of the violence. The inhumanity of it” (Johnson Sirleaf 
2009: 164).  
                                                     
24 In similar vain, Johnson Sirleaf refused to take a post in the Interim Government of the early 
1990s that had been offered to after she discovered that Winston Tubman, an eminent member 
of the former President’s family, would not be appointed in contravention of earlier 
negotiations. She took it as indication that „they were going the radical route, that the 
progressives of the 1970s were taking over the government“ (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 185).  The 
progressives‘ attempt to establish a network of power allowing them (potentially) to impose 
change was branded „returning to the old way of doing things“ (ibid.: 184) by her. 
25 Johnson Sirleaf describes having come across the works of Clower et al. (1966) and in particular 
Liebenow (1969) that might create the impression of acute crisis with most readers. In 
particular, the problems associated with an undisciplined military representing the state in the 
hinterland, routinely looting and forcibly taking “bush wives” in the process, are alluded to. 
Johnson Sirleaf appears deeply formed by the Monrovian elite’s code of conduct that abhorred 
violence in political intercourse of the elite (Liebenow 1969: 119) although “violence has always 
been just below the surface in Liberian social relations (ibid.:216). 
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Johnson Sirleaf developed a somewhat more radical attitude then, and was at the 
forefront of efforts in the Liberian diaspora in the US to support Charles Taylor’s NPFL. 
Much criticism of her has its origin in this early association with Taylor. She maintains 
having broken with Taylor quickly as his thirst for power, authoritarian mind-set, and 
self-serving tendencies became apparent (cf. Johnson Sirleaf 2009:  172-180). Indeed, 
Johnson Sirleaf – politically ambitious and willing to speak her mind – does not appear 
to be the type of person to get along with Charles Taylor for long.26 Her background in 
the pre-coup government, her association with Taylor and quite limited efforts against 
corruption in Liberia under her presidency have further entailed the accusation that she 
essentially subscribes to the neo-patrimonial patterns through which authority has 
historically been exercised in Liberia. Yet Johnson Sirleaf trajectory is that of an outsider 
to the neo-patrimonial game. She made her career essentially by excelling in 
predominantly bureaucratically structured, meritocratic environments. Notably, she did 
not try to rise in the personal networks underlying Liberia’s pre-coup government. 
When blocked in her aspirations in Liberia because of her stance, she opted for resigning 
and taking up one of the other opportunities offered internationally, rather than 
changing her socially deviant attitudes to conform to established elite culture. As well, 
from a theoretical perspective, it is plausible that she was subject to influences leading 
her to critically view ways of doing things in the environment she was born into. 
3.3.3 Liberia’s First Post-War Government 
“The real strength of [Johnson Sirleaf’s] campaign was the collection of individuals from 
other parties [than her own Unity Party (UP)], civil society organizations, and elsewhere 
in Liberian society” (Sawyer 2008: 190). This means her election victory essentially was 
the result of constructing a superior network of people influential with the grassroots, in 
particular between the two rounds of elections. Prominent or influential individuals  
supporting the Johnson Sirleaf campaign came from disparate strands of Liberian 
society. Among them were individuals from Liberia’s new “indigenous” elite 
comprising, for instance, intellectuals with a background in the state administration and 
successful businesspeople. Also important were members of Liberia’s historic Americo-
                                                     
26 As well, in the factionalized environment of Liberia, political alliances tend not to last for long.  
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Liberian establishment, of the “progressive” movements that had challenged the former 
in the 1970s, and individuals associated with the NPFL or NPP, respectively, and the 
LURD. Johnson Sirleaf’s first government strongly reflected the support she received 
during the election campaign. Table 1 provides an overview on careers and backgrounds 
of those recruited into her first cabinet. 
Table 1: Principal Liberian Cabinet Ministers, Spring 2006 
Minister 
of 
Name Background in state 
institutions 
Ethnic 
group/Fami
ly County 
Profession
/ 
Education 
Other 
Agricultu
re 
Christoph
er Toe 
Deputy Managing 
Director of Liberia 
Produce Marketing 
Corporation in late 
1970s/early 80s 
Grand Kru; 
American 
roots 
Agro-
economist 
(PhD) (US) 
In exile since 
mid-1980s; 
President of 
Strayer 
College (US) 
Commerc
e & 
Industry 
OluBankie 
King-
Akerele 
Deputy Director 
NASSCORP (Social 
Security); Ministry of 
Planning senior staff 
(1968-1980) 
Grand 
Bassa; 
American 
roots 
Economist 
(Nigeria, 
US) 
In exile since 
1980; UN 
career; 
granddaught
er of 
President 
C.D. King 
Defence Brownell 
J. Samukai 
(Col. rtd.) 
Army background 
1980s; Dep. Min. 
Defence & Police 
Director & Black Beret 
Chief Commander in 
1990s interim 
governments 
Grand Cape 
Mount, 
indigenous 
roots 
Military 
training 
(incl. in 
Israel); 
MA 
Economics 
(US) 
dauphin of 
Gabriel 
Bacchus 
Matthews; 
international 
middle level 
UN security 
jobs 
Education Joseph 
Korto 
1980s education chief 
Nimba 
Nimba, 
indigenous 
roots 
Education
al 
Administr
ation 
(PhD) (US) 
ULAA 
president; 
spent some 
two decades 
in US before 
returning for 
2005 election 
Finance Antoinette 
Sayeh 
Advisory positions in 
Ministries of Finance 
and Planning (second 
half 1980s?) 
Montserrad
o/Monrovia 
American 
roots 
Economist 
(PhD 1985, 
US) 
World Bank 
since ca. 
1989; WB 
Africa 
Director 
since 2008 
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Foreign 
Affairs 
George 
Wallace 
Since 1950s 30 years in 
MoFA; Assistant and 
Deputy Minister 
positions from Tubman 
to Taylor (Dep.Min); 
several Ambassadorial 
posts 
Maryland/ 
American 
roots 
Diplomat 
 
On fringes of 
old elite;  
Health & 
Social 
Affairs 
Walter 
Gwenigale 
CEO/Medical Dir. of 
Phebe Hospital (1974-
2003); remained in 
leading position  
Bong, 
Kpotoloma 
Village, 
indigenous 
roots 
Medical 
Doctor 
(studies 
Puerto 
Rico, 
Internship 
US) 
Aspired to 
be 
Presidential 
Candidate of 
small party; 
not 
successfull, 
switched 
party 
Internal 
Affairs 
Ambullai 
Johnson 
Excecutive in Liberia 
Produce Marketing 
Corporation 
Bomi/ambig
uous 
? Cousin of 
Sirleaf 
Justice Frances 
Johnson 
Morris 
Chief Justice (1996-97); 
Director National 
Elections Commission 
(NTGL period)  
Bomi/ 
ambiguous 
ethnicity 
Lawyer 
(Liberian-
educated) 
Cousin of 
Sirleaf; 
former 
Director 
Justice and 
Peace 
Commission 
(JPC); 
Labour Samuel 
Kofi 
Woods 
- Monrovia 
Outskirts; 
indigenous/
Kru 
Lawyer 
(2000, NL) 
Human 
rights 
activist, 
founding 
member 
FINDH; JPC; 
close to 
Amos 
Sawyer 
Lands, 
Mines & 
Energy 
Eugene 
Shannon 
Director Liberian 
Geological Survey (70 
Ambiguous 
ethnicity; 
Grand Cape 
Mount/Mar
yland/US 
background
s 
Geologist 
(PhD) (US) 
Elite Family; 
US-Liberian 
nationality; 
10 years 
with ADB  
National 
Security 
Peter B. 
Jallah 
Minister of Justice 
under Taylor 
Montserrad
o/Last name 
refers to 
lawyer Accused of 
helping to 
organise 
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African 
origin 
“Operation 
Octopus” 
NPFL attack 
on Monrovia 
1992 
Planning 
& 
Economic 
Affairs 
Toga 
McIntosh 
Government career, up 
to Minister of Planning 
(left 1981); Advisor to 
Sawyer (IGNU) 
River Cess 
American 
roots 
Economist 
(PhD) (US; 
Nigeria et 
al.) 
Divorced 
husband to 
Miatta 
Beysolo 
(Sirleaf 
friend);  
UNECA-
positions; 
Senior NPFL 
Executive, 
defected 
1991 
Posts & 
Tele-
communi
cations 
Jackson E. 
Doe 
Deputy Director of 
Presidential Security & 
Deputy director of 
government insurance 
agency (Doe 
Government) 
Grand 
Gedeh / 
Krahn 
Military 
backgroun
d / 
Economist 
cousin of 
former 
President 
Samuel K. 
Doe; 
executive 
member of 
LURD rebel 
group 
Public 
Works 
Willis 
Knuckles 
Assistant, later Deputy 
Minister of Youth & 
Sports (1977-1980) 
Montserrad
o, American 
roots 
Physicist 
(BSc) 
(Liberian-
educated) 
US Exile; 
Successful in 
private 
business 
since 1980; 
successful  
Transport Jeremiah 
Sulunteh 
Cuttington University 
Professor (2002-05) 
Suakoko, 
Bong 
County 
Indigenous/ 
Kpelle 
Economist
/Administr
ation 
(Cairo, 
Canada) 
formerly 
employed in 
state-run 
development 
institutions;  
Refugee 
background 
(CDI), then 
international 
education;  2 
years with 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
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Yet which factors or qualities were decisive for them being nominated, and what do 
the nominations tell about the sociology of Liberia’s post-war elite? A key credential 
characterizing Johnson Sirleaf’s appointments is qualification as measured by formal 
education and relevant work experience. Given Liberia’s dire educational situation, 
education as a criterion for recruitment severely restricts the circle of those eligible for 
elite status. Further, a disproportionally large share of elites has pursued studies at 
educational institutions abroad and in the US in particular. This suggests patterns of 
closed elite reproduction operating through the nexus of high social status and 
privileged access to education may be particularly relevant. The opportunity to study 
abroad partly overlaps with belonging to Liberia’s historic Americo-Liberian 
establishment. Travels and studies were financed either privately or, more often, 
through government scholarships. As mentioned above, the right connections were a 
precondition to obtain the latter. Yet Liberian society was open to some competition for 
social status.  
Much more than Johnson Sirleaf, Transport Minister Jeremiah Sulunteh and Labour 
Minister Samuel Kofi Woods illustrate opportunities for social advancement. Sulunteh 
from the indigenous Kpelle ethnic group hails from a rural village of the 3,000-strong 
Gwetamue community in Bong County and reportedly was the first individual from his 
community to obtain an MA degree (Analyst 13.04.2006). Indicating an eminent position 
of his family in the traditional order, Sulunteh had obtained his BSc at Cuttington 
University College in Bong, Liberia’s best tertiary institution. Working at the 
government-run College after his studies, he obtained a Staff Development Scholarship 
of the institution allowing him to pursue his MA at the American University of Cairo. He 
later had the opportunity to study in Toronto on an internationally financed scholarship 
(cf. Ministry of Transport 2 October 2006; cf. WINNE 11 September 2008). Samuel Kofi 
Woods was born to a Kru fisherman in a Monrovia slum community and was the only 
one of his father’s 23 children to finish school. Offering work services in return, he 
obtained a scholarship from the Catholic Church for one of its high schools educating the 
children of the elite (African Affairs 99/2000: 98).27 Possessing strong oratory skills, he 
                                                     
27 The Catholic Church has few members in Liberia but is extremely influential. In this respect, its 
Knights of St. John brotherhood may rival the influence of the increasingly important secret elite 
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later became President of the University of Liberia Students’ Union (ULSU) and an 
internationally reputed human rights activist. 
There is a relevant degree of social mobility in Liberia, and as probably everywhere 
else, social advancement into the elite for those not privileged tends to take place over 
generations. On the other hand, social relegation appears to be frequent and coming 
from a distinguished family does not guarantee elite status. Families are often large, 
there is fierce competition for state resources and not everybody can be taken care of, 
although family connections tend to provide a cushion for less fortunate offspring.28 
Yet individuals raised in the historically established elite are at a clear advantage in 
terms of access to social, economic and cultural capital (cf. Bourdieu 1983). Against the 
background of regime change and war since the 1980s, the tendency for social, economic 
and cultural capital to accumulate in circles was reinforced. For Liberians and the 
historic elite in particular, incentives to leave the country increased following the coup. 
For many, studying abroad until conditions improved at home was the primary 
objective. The US-American diaspora, organized in many small civil society 
organizations united in the umbrella Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas 
(ULAA) is an important environment for the accumulation of social capital.29 
The importance of social capital is that it is a precondition for generating personal 
trust. Liberia had and has an extremely feeble bureaucratic apparatus, and in the 
medium to long run, domination has to be exercised essentially through personal 
networks of authority. Given a political environment characterized by rivalry, betrayal 
and private appropriation of government offices with little respect for central policy 
                                                                                                                                                              
United Brothers Friendship (UBF) society. As consequence of its quest to grow, the Catholic 
Church is one of the relatively accessible avenues for social advancement for the less 
privileged. 
28 For instance, according to a daughter of his, Richard A. Henries, a legendary Speaker of the 
House of Representatives for 27 years, had 44 children with his wife and several concubines. 
Henries was one of thirteen Americo-Liberian elites summarily executed shortly after the 
military coup. In 2011, no member of the Henries family was in a senior government position 
yet two male Henries ran one of Liberia’s important law firms mediating between foreign 
businesses and the government. The quoted daughter, poor by UNDP standards but not 
particularly deprived by Liberian ones, lived a very moderate life in a simple house without 
any legal or illegal electricity connection and is highly critical of an elite she clearly does not 
feel part of (private conversation with  one of Henries’ daughters, Monrovia, April 2011). 
29 It is indicative for the importance of the US diaspora in politics that, for instance, Charles Taylor 
had been board Chairman and Johnson Sirleaf’s Minister of Education Joseph Korto President 
of the ULAA before starting their political careers. 
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directives,30 having a network of trusted individuals in important positions of power is a 
precondition for being able to govern. Assuming Johnson Sirleaf indeed is interested in 
reform, personal knowledge of senior executive staff is essential to have an idea of their 
integrity.31 As Johnson Sirleaf herself was deeply involved with the Liberian diaspora in 
the US during her years of studying and exile, this social environment is of particular 
importance for the formation of Liberia’s current political elite. Notwithstanding, as trust 
is the prime variable and it is generated in particular through family connections, 
relatives of Johnson Sirleaf occupy several senior positions. Of course, being related to 
Johnson Sirleaf overlaps with being connected in the US diaspora and the historic elite 
environment. 
In addition to qualification and trust, the twin complex of being influential with 
population segments and having used that influence to the benefit of Johnson Sirleaf’s 
election campaign was another major criterion for recruitment into the political elite. The 
criteria of being well connected in Johnson Sirleaf’s milieu and being popular with 
grassroots cannot easily be reconciled. Long-term US residents and descendants of 
Liberia’s historic elite in particular tend to be socially distant from poor and rural people 
and to be neither appreciated by nor influential with grassroots. Thus, settler descent 
and US diaspora membership tend to overlap with social capital in the form of elite 
connections while grassroots activism generates social capital in the form of influence 
with political constituencies. 
Among Liberia’s Ministers, we can thus roughly distinguish between those who 
obtained the post essentially because of elite connections and their personal connection 
to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in particular, and those who obtained their post because of 
influence in Liberian society and campaign support. Among the former, we can 
distinguish between those professionals who built their relations essentially in an 
international environment, those who are first of all nationally connected, and those who 
belong to Johnson Sirleaf’s family.  
                                                     
30 As Africa Confidential once titled: „The post-war economy is easier to manage than Monrovia’s 
politicians“ (Africa Confidential 15 December 2006). 
31 Tellingly, „corruption“ is as well referred to as „the cultural thing“ in Liberia (Ellis/Haar 2004: 
157). What is called “integrity” in the West is deviant and often socially sanctioned behaviour 
in Liberia, rendering any rationalization of governance extremely difficult. 
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The elite group is identified with Christopher Toe, Olubankie King-Akerele, 
Antoinette Sayeh (a former World Bank colleague), Willis Knuckles (whose courier 
service constituted an important link between US exiles and their Liberian families), 
Eugene Shannon,32 Toga McIntosh, and George Wallace. Some of these have an 
established position in Liberian society rather than the international sphere, and are 
influential with certain elite circles. Thus, George Wallace is much more a Liberian elite 
than an international professional, Toga McIntosh is well embedded in Liberia’s 
“progressive” circles, and Willis Knuckles is established and well-connected as a 
Liberian businessman. Of course, members of Johnson Sirleaf’s family – Ambullai 
Johnson as well as Frances Johnson Morris and National Security Agency Director 
Fomba Sirleaf as well as presidential advisor Robert Sirleaf – belong to the group closely 
connected to and trusted by Johnsons Sirleaf although they indeed form a special sub-
category. 
The second group is more closely identified with Brownell Samukai, Samuel K. 
Woods, Jeremiah Sulunteh, Walter Gwenigale, Joseph Korto, Varba Gayflor, and Jackson 
E. Doe. Although all of these have significant international connections, all were 
established in Liberia or West Africa rather than on the international scene and, except 
for Woods, served to symbolically integrate the indigenous element into the state. 
Samukai is well connected with the two “progressive” milieus around the political rivals 
of Gabriel Bacchus Matthews (†) and 1990s Interim President Amos Sawyer. Korto was 
presidential candidate of a small party in the first round, came second in populous and 
nationally important Nimba County, and lent Johnson Sirleaf’s campaign there a 
valuable hand. Sulunteh similarly had been vice standard bearer for another party and 
was credited with winning the important Bong County for it in the first round. By the 
same token, Gwenigale was considered very influential in Bong and energetically 
supported the future President’s campaign there. 
                                                     
32 Eugene Shannon comes from a well-established family based in Cape Mount county and is 
widely considered Americo-Liberian in the country (cf. Times 27 May 2009). However, some 
sources suggest he is a descendant of Eugene Himie Shannon (1893-1959), born to indigenous 
Grebo parents in Maryland county, who rose thanks to opportunities an Episcopalian church 
position of his uncle offered (cf. Dunn/Holsoe 1985: 158; cf. Concern Liberians 2011).   
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Samuel Kofi Woods is considered “Liberia’s leading human rights activist” (African 
Affairs 99/2000: 97) by many and is well connected among Liberia’s “progressives”, most 
of whom supported Johnson Sirleaf. He built a reputation in Liberia and his Sierra 
Leonean exile, and received a Netherlands government scholarship in 2000 only, after 
almost 20 years of human rights activism in the region. He is the son of a Liberian Kru 
fisherman who grew up in Nigeria, travelled along the coast and mingled with coastal 
Fanti in Ghana (African Affairs 99/2000: 97). Charismatic and eloquent, he became an 
influential student leader mobilizing against the military regime of the 1980s.33 Under 
military ruleIn Liberia, Woods is widely considered “a Ghanaian” assimilated into the 
elite because of his father’s time abroad,34 his middle name and his modern posture, 
rendering it difficult for him to gain favour with political constituencies beyond a 
segment of the student population and Liberia’s “progressive” circles. Gayflor 
established very good relationships with women representatives during her 
administrative career, starting out as a low-level government employee charged with 
liaising with women civil society organizations.35 She thus appeals to an electorate 
defined important by the President and additionally provides a link to populous and 
politically important Lofa.36 Jackson E. Doe served to symbolically integrate the ethnic 
constituency of former President Samuel Doe and the Aicha Conneh-faction of the 
LURD,37 the latter having supported Johnson Sirleaf’s campaign. In addition to those 
listed in Table 1, Vice President Joseph Boakai as well belonged to the group of Liberian-
                                                     
33 Interview with Samuel Kofi Woods, 17 March 2010, Monrovia. 
34 Some members of the political elite refer to Woods’ allegedly foreign status to deny him the 
right to political activity in Liberia. Thus, after having been criticized publicly by Woods for 
severely beating his niece, rival Liberty Party Senator Nathaniel Innis famously expressed that 
as a Ghanaian, Woods “ should eat his own because Liberia is an elephant meat” (The News 26 
June 2008). Elephant meat comes in large quantities and symbolizes riches but is considered 
extremely tough and hard to “chop”. 
35 Interview with Varbah Gayflor 17 March 2011, Monrovia 
36 Varbah Gayflor was named Co-Chairperson of the UP’s National Campaign Committee (UP-
NCC)established for the 2011 election chaired by an influential “indigenous” lawmaker. Other 
persons occupying leading positions were Samuel Kofi Woods, Amara Conneh, Augustine 
Ngafuan and Jeremiah Sulunteh, i.e. Liberian-based individuals that, except for Woods, are 
widely considered indigenous (cf. FrontPageAfrica 05 June 2011). 
37 The LURD had officially been led by Sekou Conneh but his second wife Aicha, a “spiritual 
adviser” of Guinean President Lansana Conté, had wielded immense influence behind the 
scene. The couple and in consequence LURD split over nominations in the NTGL, with Aicha 
Conneh controlling the larger faction. Illiterate Aicha could not be nominated to a government 
post but was allocated an honorary campaign position in Johnson Sirleaf’s Unity Party. 
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based elites. Boakai had studied at Kansas State University and had shortly been 
Minister of Agriculture in the 1980s but is nowadays known as a successful businessman 
well reputed in his home county of Lofa.  
So far, qualification, trust and political expediency can be formulated as criteria to be 
recruited into the political elite. The former two clearly dominated in choosing principal 
cabinet ministers. The criteria overlap with being connected in the established elite but 
being disconnected from both Liberian grassroots and domestically established socio-
political forces. The latter figured somewhat more prominently on the second and lower 
levels of government. 
In the context of this study, the career development of former warring party elites is 
of particular interest. Most elites of the former Charles Taylor government had 
supported Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in the second round election campaign of 2005,38  as had 
the largest LURD faction associated with Aicha Conneh. The former is regionally rooted 
in Nimba and Bong Counties and generally enjoyed widespread support, particularly 
among youths. The LURD’s popular support was significantly more restricted but 
nonetheless considerable among Mandingo, who constitute a sizeable minority in Lofa 
County, and to a lesser extent Krahn. 
Yet relatively few warring party elites were coopted into the government. The 
LURD’s Soko V. Sackor was made Deputy Minister of Posts, its Military Spokesman 
Charles Bennie led a subdivision at the Ministry of Commerce until clashing with the 
President in 2008,39 and political branch executive Kabineh Ja’neh was allocated a post 
on the bench of the Supreme Court. A senior former executive of the United Liberation 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia-Kromah (ULIMO-K), Morris Dukuly, was made Chief 
                                                     
38 NPP presidential candidate Roland Massaquoi, his popular rival Francis Garlawolo, Gen. 
Adolphus Dolo, and Taylor’s wife Jewel Howard Taylor as well as a number of less prominent 
NPP executives and Generals supported the Johnson Sirleaf campaign. Taylor’s Vice President 
Moses Blah was the only senior NPP executive who declared to support her rival George Weah 
but later appeared to have changed his mind, allegedly on the orders of Charles Taylor 
(FrontPageAfrica 4 November 2005; cf. Daily Observer 31 October 2005). 
39 In what was the worst single atrocity after the war, some 20 people sent by Charles Bennie to 
clear a piece of land he claims to have inherited were killed or „diappeared“ in 2008. Roland 
Kaine, a former NPFL commander and legislator who similarly claimed the land, was accused 
of organizing the massacre. He was however declared not guilty by an underpaid hinterland 
judge without adequate protection residing in the vicinity of Kaine’s constituency. Bennie 
subsequently accused the president on radio of aiding and abetting human rights abuses by 
not intervening, ran into trouble in the ministry, and eventually resigned. 
 47 
 
of Office Staff of the President. The ULIMO-K was an armed faction in the 1990s war and 
a precursor to the LURD, and Dukuly had supported Johnson Sirleaf in elections 1997 
and 2005.  
As well, Johnsons Sirleaf made a considerable effort to integrate the political (rather 
than the military) executives of LURD and civilian elites from its social basis. Musa 
Bility, a successful businessman, had established the National Mandingo Caucus in the 
run-up to the elections, effectively an ethnically based campaign support group for 
Johnson Sirleaf. Bility was later allocated the NPA Board of Directors Chairman post, 
effectively a sinecure. Similarly, Luseni Donzo, Acting Minister of Public Works in the 
first few months of the Johnson Sirleaf government and later Infrastructure Adviser of 
the President, is one of the Mandingo elites well connected in his ethnic milieu.40 
Prominent Taylor elites figured even less prominently in the executive branch.41 
Peter Bonner Jallah, formerly Minister of Justice and allegedly a long-time NPFL 
member, was the most high-profile takeover appointed Minister of National Security.42 
Juanita Neal, a confidante of Charles Taylor deeply involved in the financial 
organization of his rule, initially was maintained in her position as Deputy Minister for 
Revenue at Finance. Freddy Taylor, Charles Taylor’s intelligence chief,43 was appointed 
Deputy Minister for Administration at Justice (Africa Confidential 19 November 2010). 
Benoni “Goldfinger” Urey,44 a core NPFL official and key financial official of Charles 
Taylor was appointed Mayor of his hometown Careysburg near Monrovia. A few other 
NPFL elites and Generals were appointed Mayors (cf. Africa Confidential 6 November 
                                                     
40 Yet LURD members were not satisfied. When I paid a visit to Aicha Conneh in February 2006 
shortly after the Cabinet had been announced, anger and a sense of betrayal among the crowd 
in front of her house were palpable. Some alleged the LURD had been promised 10 percent of 
senior government positions. Musa Bility, a fuel importer amongst others, was allegedly 
promised the lucrative post of Managing Director of the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, 
which handles and stores Liberia’s fuel imports.   
41 However, some 15 of 94 seats in the two chambers of the legislature were won by individuals 
associated with the Taylor regime in the 2005 elections. 
42 The first Minister of National Security of the Johnson Sirleaf government was appointed in 2008 
only. 
43 More specifically, he was Director General of the National Security Ageny. 
44 Johnson Sirleaf’s family was close to the Americo Liberian elite Urey family, and she knew 
Benoni since childhood days (Johnson Sirleaf 2009: 9). Benoni Urey is as well a cousin to 
Johnson Sirleaf’s “old friend” (ibid: 246) Willis Knuckles (Africa Confidential 20 January 2006). 
Johnson Sirleaf as well heavily supported the campaign of his brother and UP member, 
Clemenceau Urey, for a Senate seat. 
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2009), notably in Taylor’s stronghold Ganta (Nimba).45 NPP presidential candidate 
Roland Massaquoi was eventually appointed Chairman and NPP youth leader 
Emmanuel Lomax a Member of the Board of the Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation. 
 Johnson Sirleaf, however, rescinded her decision to appoint Emmanuel Shaw 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Liberia Airports Authority after “details 
regarding sanctions imposed against Mr. Shaw by the United Nations and the United 
States Government (…) have been brought to her attention” (Executive Mansion 27 May 
2011). Shaw was a key financial adviser to Charles Taylor and is suspected of playing a 
major role in managing and hiding assets held by the former President (cf. Coalition of 
International Justice 2005: Annex 7). Both Benoni Urey and Emmanuel Shaw were on the 
UN travel ban and asset freeze lists at the time of their nomination. In the light of 
support of most Taylor associates to Johnson Sirleaf, it is noteworthy that the Liberian 
government has made no effort to implement the UN assets freeze in Liberia, allowing 
the latter to play an important role in business and social rather than political life. It was 
however widely rumoured in Monrovia that Johnson Sirleaf had to promise not to ask 
for the extradition of Charles Taylor in return for election support. If so, the promise has 
been broken. Politically, this implies Charles Taylor has been removed as head of a 
political network and possible rival of President Johnson Sirleaf while his senior 
associates have been integrated into the government patronage network, albeit on 
subaltern levels.46 
A number of cabinet replacements and reshuffles took place during Johnson Sirleaf’s 
first term, and in 2011 hardly any Minister still occupied the portfolio he/she been 
assigned in 2006.47 Only rarely have there been official explanations. A substantial 
number of resignations upon request of the President and dismissals appear to have 
come as a consequence of evidence of corruption. Transfers from one ministry to another 
may respond to technocratic imperatives, i.e. represent transfers of competent and 
                                                     
45 I owe this piece of information to Mariam Persson (Persson/Utas 2011). 
46 In an interview, a principal Minister opined that Taylor’s associates were still influential but 
nowadays had to submit to the authority of the new President. Relevant?... 
47 The Wikipedia web site on Ellen Johnson Sirleaf shows accurately appointments and changes to 
the cabinet. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ellen_Johnson_Sirleaf (27.07.2011)  
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integer personnel to critical institutions,48 or occur in response to patrimonial concerns 
over building of fiefs by subordinates. The summary dismissal of the entire cabinet in 
November 2010 appeared to follow a patrimonial logic of demonstrating discretionary 
power of the President. Notwithstanding, it may have been intended to provide an 
opportunity to rationalize the administration by rewarding loyalty and integrity. In the 
end, only a fifth of cabinet and senior civil service positions were changed after the 
reshuffle (Africa Confidential 7 January 2011). 
The Johnson Sirleaf government is widely accused by its opponents and even some 
sympathizers of packing her government with friends at home in the US rather than 
Liberia and having their background in the Americo-Liberian elite (cf. Africa 
Confidential 14 May 2010). As the analysis above has shown, there is some truth to that. 
However, two countervailing tendencies appear important. First, although a number of 
presidential confidantes were maintained in their positions for extended periods despite 
mounting evidence of abuse of office, established personal relations to the President did 
not render compromised officials untouchable. The President’s cousin Ambullai Johnson 
lost his position as did her long-term confidantes, LPRC-Boss Harry Greaves and 
Minister of State Morris Saytumah. Similarly, individuals belonging to the inner circle of 
the historic elite, i.e. OluBanke King-Akerele, Eugene Shannon and National Investment 
Commission Director Richard Tolbert clashed with the President and had to leave 
government.49 The historically eminent families of Liberia cannot be said to be 
particularly well represented in the government. On the other hand, it is quite likely that 
one or two individuals from these large families hold a senior administrative position.50 
                                                     
48 Integrity and trust of the President may be more important (and more difficult to find) than 
technical competence. For instance, former Minister of Labour Tiawon Gongloe, a well-reputed 
indigenous human rights lawyer widely considered integer, was offered the position of 
Minister of Posts after the reshuffle but declined to take it because he considered himself 
lacking relevant expertise (Interview with Tiawon Gongloe, 3 April 2011, Monrovia).  
49 Among those named, King-Akerele was the only individual who did not appear severely 
compromised, although she was blamed for problems over the issuance of new passports. As 
well, she was the only one of those named above who was not so much forced out of 
government but refused to take up another position after the reshuffle of November 2010. Still, 
the case demonstrates Johnson Sirleaf’s willingness to clash with long-term friends and 
confidantes. 
50 For instance, Elfreda Stewart Tamba from the influential Stewart dynasty replaced Taylor’s 
associate Juanita Neal from an equally important family as Deputy Minister of Finance. 
Interestingly, Stewart Tamba has pursued an almost exclusively domestic career, working for 
more than 35 years at the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment (part of under Director 
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Second, Johnson Sirleaf came under increasing pressure to nominate more Liberian-
based individuals into government during her tenure. In this respect it may be 
noteworthy that two to three senior government positions formerly staffed with 
individuals not associated with any Liberian constituency were re-allocated with a view 
to political expediency. As uncompromised but unpopular “American” Antoinette Sayeh 
left her position for a senior World Bank assignment, “indigenous” Augustine Ngafuan 
was nominated Minister of Finance. Ngafuan formerly was a student leader, remained 
popular among Liberian students and was ”instrumental in handling (…) [the UP’s] 
campaign among Liberian students in 2005” (Africa Confidential 19 November 2010). 
After Ambullai Johnson’s apparently forced resignation in 2008 (cf. Analyst 23 February 
2010; cf. Informer 11 June 2010), Harrison Karnweah was named Minister of Internal 
Affairs. Karnweah had started in low-level positions but risen to senior positions with a 
foreign rubber corporation, and became NPFL County Commander for Nimba, 
reportedly with the rank of “General”. Known as a “full blooded NPP stalwart” (Public 
Agenda n.d.), he is a prominent “indigenous” citizen of Nimba County with significant 
electoral appeal in his home region and probably beyond (cf. Nordic Africa News 5 July 
2011). Thus, as the elections 2011 approached, the Johnson Sirleaf government 
increasingly featured indigenous (probably compromised) personalities more 
prominently.51 
                                                                                                                                                              
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf) although she studied in the US for two years in the early 1980s 
(Interview with Elfreda Stewart Tamba, 11.04.2011).  
51 With some reservations, the nomination of Amara Konneh to the position of Minister of 
Planning falls into the same category. Konneh was a youthful Harvard student without any 
established Liberian constituency during Johnson Sirleaf’s 2005 campaign. He made important 
contributions to the campaign effort and played a leading role in the US-based Liberians for 
Ellen (LIFE) support group (cf. Johnson-Sirleaf 2009: 253-265; cf. Africa Confidential 19 
November 2010). Yet members of his Mandingo ethnic group consider him one of theirs, rather 
than an Americo-Liberian, and he is likely to further bind this important electoral segment to 
the UP. 
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4. Conclusion  
The analysis of Liberia’s post-war government suggests that the Liberian political elite 
has undergone considerable socio-political change in long-term perspective. Roughly 
half the cabinet of early 2006 was staffed with individuals associated with ethnic groups 
that historically were underrepresented in government. Although people from less 
privileged backgrounds historically were presented with some opportunities for political 
success, the extent to which these were recently represented in senior political positions 
constitutes a significant deviation from past experiences. Further, a sizeable portion of 
governing elites has its background in the progressive movements of the 1970s that 
formerly were in a marginal position in Liberia’s historically consolidated pre-1980 
order. In addition, an important share of elites comes from families at the insecure 
fringes rather than the established center of power, as the case of Johnson Sirleaf and her 
relatives indicate. 
Important reasons for this development were the political turbulences characterizing 
much of the period since 1980 that undermined sources of power and cohesiveness of the 
old Americo-Liberian elite. Another major reason is the political democratization of 
Liberia, which implied that preferences of lower status population segments and the 
hinterland population in particular had to be taken into account to a greater degree in 
staffing government offices. This however indicates that processes of elite closure 
working through the causal chain mechanism of elite position, personal wealth and 
establishment of patronage networks may become more important in future (see Image 
3, Chapter 1). Reach of clientelistic networks may be extended but a more inclusive and 
diverse elite does not necessarily translate into greater accountability of government. As 
well, social rise tends to take place over generations, and most of those who rose still had 
a relatively privileged position among marginal groups, as is the case of offspring of 
chiefs. This means the basic mechanisms depicted in Image 2 remains applicable, 
although a slight modification may be considered explicitly accounting for the 
opportunity to accumulate economic, social and cultural capital from a lower but still 
relatively privileged position. Only very few elites come from most deprived 
backgrounds. Their ability to rise refers to the very limited and probably only 
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coincidentally arising opportunities for outsiders to receive quality education as well as 
some openness of the social elite environment allowing to accumulate elite cultural 
capital, for instance in schools attended by the offspring of the privileged few. 
However, there are undeniable continuities, too. Roughly half of Liberia’s cabinet 
comes from historically privileged families. For this group, the ability to translate family 
status into intra-elite connections and superior education is of outstanding importance, 
which refers to the mechanism of oligarchic elite reproduction visualized in Image 2 of 
the theoretical chapter.  
Generally, a major feature distinguishing Liberia’s governing elite from the vast 
majority of Liberians is education obtained abroad and in the US in particular. The 
importance of foreign education appears markedly increased, due to both the 
deterioration of Liberia’s educational institutions and forced migration during the war. 
This is the source of criticism of Liberia’s government being packed with the President’s 
“friends from the US”. This again refers to very real sentiment of frustration among 
significant parts of Liberian youths hardly educated at all or educated in domestic 
institutions, feeling that the opportunity structure in Liberia denies chances to be 
successful in life. The distinction further points to a relatively new cleavage emerging in 
Liberia and distinguishing elites from lower strata, the cleavage between those educated 
abroad and those dependent on the weak Liberian educational system. Having the 
connections, financial means and background allowing to obtain a visa and financing the 
costs of studies abroad may develop into a prime mechanism of elite closure. 
The analysis further proposed to conceptualize Liberia’s elite as patterned according 
to neo-patrimonial principles. Neo-patrimonial political organization of Liberia first of 
all is inherited from the past, and a logical outcome of further de-institutionalization 
during the war. Despite Liberia’s evident neo-patrimonial patterns, the President may 
indeed be pursuing a project of bureaucratizing reform. To the extent that reforms are 
introduced and in particular allow broader strata access to quality education and social 
success on the basis of merit, the elite system may become systemically more open for 
newcomers in long-term perspective. However, there is wide-spread resistance against 
reform among Liberia’s elites, and to the extent it fails, a mechanism of oligarchical elite 
perpetuation characterizing neo-patrimonial democracies working through the causal 
 53 
 
change of having political power, privatizing spoils of power, and establishing 
patronage networks is likely to become a “patterning pattern”. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on methodological problems of elite research in Africa 
in particular. This study is based on the analysis of a small sample of elites holding 
formal positions of power. In neo-patrimonial system, significant power may be 
exercised totally informally or by persons in formally little powerful positions. In Liberia 
as elsewhere, perceptions are wide-spread that “real” power is held by individuals and 
elite circles hidden from public view. However, it is no alternative to thorough analysis 
to revert to conspiracy theories. Rather, we have to reflect on methods allowing to make 
visible possibly existent but hidden influences on government.52  
 
 
                                                     
52 In the African context, the reputational method  is of very limited use in this regard, as it still 
presupposes relatively high visibility of relations of power and public knowledge about power 
holders.  
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